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ABSTRACT 
The lack of legal uniformity in the National Network of Fusion Centers, or National 
Network, is not a simple problem, and there is no simple solution; however, operating in a 
“network” with 79 fusion centers and 54 different legal frameworks while trying to detect 
and prevent criminal―and terrorism-related activity―is not a simple task, either. And 
despite the expenditure of significant federal, state, and local dollars to establish a capable 
and robust network of fusion centers, insufficient time and energy has been dedicated to the 
creation of an effective and uniform legal framework for the National Network. Through 
interviews with leadership from 11 fusion centers, this thesis addresses the complications 
of non-uniformity and evaluates three legal mechanisms with the potential to create 
uniformity. This research reveals that a congressionally approved interstate compact would 
be the most effective legal mechanism to create uniformity within the National Network 
because it results in state statutory authority in every participating jurisdiction, has the 
potential to create national legal uniformity, and respects the sovereignty of the states vis-à-
vis the federal government. 
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The National Network of Fusion Centers, or National Network, is operating at a 
significant disadvantage; there are 79 fusion centers in the National Network implicating 
the state and local laws of 50 states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories.1 
In addition, each fusion center that accepts funding from the Homeland Security Grant 
Program is subject to certain federal laws as a condition of federal funding, which creates 
a multi-layered, multi-jurisdictional legal framework within the National Network. This 
research evaluates whether the lack of legal uniformity creates operational challenges that 
impact the effectiveness of the network, as well as if there is a legal mechanism that 
would enable the National Network to create legal uniformity in all 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, and the U.S. territories. 
Due to the limited literature addressing the lack of legal uniformity within the 
National Network, exploratory interviews of fusion center directors, deputy directors, and 
senior leaders were conducted to gain the perspective of leadership from a variety of state 
and major urban-area fusion centers across the country. The interviewees were 
questioned about their fusion center’s form of legal establishment and how it impacts 
day-to-day operations, the impact of existing state laws on information sharing within the 
state and across state lines, the types of laws that would be most desirable if a national 
legal framework were developed, and whether the federal or state governments should 
determine the national legal framework for fusion centers. The interview results suggest 
fusion center leadership supports the establishment of legal uniformity, indicating three 
priorities for a legal framework: state statutory authority for fusion center operations, the 
desire for national legal uniformity, and the assurance of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
federal government.  
This thesis presents three legal mechanisms that have the potential to create legal 
uniformity and examines whether each legal mechanism satisfies the priorities 
                                                 
1 “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed 
March 26, 2018, www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. The National Network 
includes fusion centers from three U.S. territories: Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. 
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established by fusion center leadership. The first legal mechanism, model laws, are 
proposed statutory schemes that are developed by a consortium of interested parties 
attempting to facilitate regional or national legal uniformity on specific issues. The 
application of the interviewees’ criteria reveals that model laws satisfy two of the three 
priorities expressed by fusion center leadership. Model laws can develop state statutory 
authority and honor state sovereignty; however, model laws do not create a likelihood of 
national uniformity. 
The second legal mechanism, federal law, is the body of law developed by 
Congress, signed by the president, and reviewed by the federal courts, as outlined in 
article 1, section 1, of the U.S. Constitution. The application of the interviewees’ criteria 
reveals that federal law would satisfy one of the three priorities of the interviewees. 
Although the creation of federal law for the National Network is the only option that 
guarantees legal uniformity across the network, the remaining two criteria, the creation of 
state statutory authority and the maintenance of state sovereignty, are not satisfied by the 
use of this particular legal mechanism. Based on the perspectives provided by the 
interviewees, state and local governments are in the best position to manage and operate 
the National Network and the development of federal law to govern the network will 
likely be met with significant resistance. 
The third legal mechanism, an interstate compact, is “an agreement between two 
or more states established for the purpose of remedying a particular problem of multistate 
concern.”2 An interstate compact is not only a formal legal contract with the related 
enforcement options; it also shares state legislative adoption authority and enforcement.3 
And due to article 1, section 10, clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Compact 
Clause, congressional approval of an interstate compact is required if it affects the 
balance of power between the federal and state governments or when it encroaches on a 
                                                 
2 Kevin J. Heron, “The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to 
Congressionally Coerced Agreements,” St. John’s Law Review 60, no. 1 (June 2012): 4, 
http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol60/iss1/1. 
3 “Understanding Interstate Compacts,” National Center for Interstate Compacts, accessed March 26, 
2018, http://www.cglslgp.org/media/1313/understanding_interstate_compacts-csgncic.pdf. 
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power granted to Congress.4 If an interstate compact receives congressional approval, it 
transforms the compact into federal law.5 The application of the interviewees’ criteria 
reveals that a congressionally approved interstate compact has the potential to satisfy all 
three priorities of the interviewees. First, the enactment of an interstate compact creates 
statutory authority in every participating state. Second, due to the contractual nature of 
interstate compacts, every state that enacts the interstate compact has identical or 
substantially similar laws, alleviating the stress and chaos of non-uniformity among 
fusion centers in an information-sharing environment.6 Last, the ability of fusion center 
leaders to participate in the development of the legal and operational framework for the 
National Network satisfies the concerns of the interviewees who feel that the network 
should remain in the hands of state and local governments.  
The comparison of three legal mechanisms with the potential to create legal 
uniformity leads to the conclusion that an interstate compact is the most beneficial 
approach to satisfy the reported desires of the policymakers within the National Network. 
In addition to creating statutory authority within each participating state and territory, an 
interstate compact has the potential to create legitimate national uniformity for fusion 
center operations. As reported, the interviews reflect a very low tolerance for federal 
involvement in the development of the legal and operational framework for the National 
Network. However, since interstate compacts honor the principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty vis-à-vis the federal government, the interstate compact development process 
allows policymakers within the network to determine the most appropriate legal and 
operational framework to maximize the capabilities of the National Network.  
 
  
                                                 
4 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). 
5 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981).  
6 Non-material changes to the compact language does not necessarily invalidate an interstate compact. 
As an example of how EMAC handled this issue, § 4 of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
states, “The validity of this compact shall not be affected by any insubstantial difference in its form or 
language as adopted by the States.” Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321, 
104th Cong., 2d sess. (October 19, 1996). 
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The National Network of Fusion Centers, or National Network, is operating at a 
significant disadvantage; there are 79 fusion centers in the National Network implicating 
the state and local laws of 50 states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories.1 
In addition, each fusion center that accepts funding from the Homeland Security Grant 
Program is subject to certain federal laws as a condition of federal funding. This multi-
layered, multi-jurisdictional legal framework causes uncertainty and, ultimately, a lack of 
trust as to how critical information sharing–related issues will be addressed across state 
lines. In order to equip the National Network with the tools necessary to be successful in 
the homeland security environment, fusion centers must establish their existence in law, 
determine an appropriate legal framework to aid them in their mission, and encourage 
uniformity from the membership of the National Network.2 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
State and major urban-area fusion centers are subject to competing legal interests 
that affect their ability to execute the intended fusion center mission. Fusion centers are 
not federal entities; rather, they are products of state and local governments and, as a 
result, are subject to state and local laws, policies, and mission priorities. They were 
developed to serve as partners to one another—as well as to the federal government—
through the U.S. Intelligence Community. Because fusion centers contribute to the 
national mission, the federal government supports the National Network through funding, 
personnel support, and sponsored training.3 Therefore, in addition to the state and local 
laws that may apply to a fusion center, each fusion center must also comply with federal 
                                                 
1 “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed 
March 26, 2018, www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. The National Network 
includes fusion centers from Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam.  
2 The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the Nevada Attorney General’s Office. 
3 Offices of Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice, Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, March 2017), 42, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/ 
2017/a1721.pdf. 
 2 
laws and regulations associated with federal grant funding. As a result of the multiple 
laws affecting fusion center operations, fusion centers can experience legal conflict, 
confusion, and insecurity when addressing issues that cross state lines and implicate 
conflicting or inconsistent state laws. The lack of legal uniformity impedes the National 
Network’s ability to share information across state lines and to function seamlessly as a 
network. 
The legal non-uniformity in the National Network is a symptom of federalism. 
Federalism is the shared power between the federal government and the state 
governments with the respective division of power outlined in the U.S. Constitution. 
Amendment 10 of the Constitution limits federal authority by stating that any powers not 
granted to the federal government rests with the states. In practical terms, this provision 
means that any powers not granted to the federal government within the U.S. Constitution 
are areas of control left to the state governments. As a result, each state has the authority 
to create and enforce criminal and civil laws, determine its public policies, and manage 
its own affairs.4 Because every state and territory in the nation has these inherent powers, 
the National Network is faced with 54 legal frameworks to operate one network, which 
presents an ongoing operational challenge. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Does the lack of legal uniformity in the National Network of Fusion 
Centers create operational challenges that limit the effectiveness of the 
network? 
2. Is there a legal mechanism that enables the National Network to create 
legal uniformity in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. 
territories? 
  
                                                 
4 96 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Sovereignty: Relationship to Federal Government § 2 (2018).  
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research considers the interview results involving 11 directors, deputy 
directors, and senior leaders from recognized fusion centers within the National 
Network.5 Understanding the practical impacts of legal and operational non-uniformity, 
from the perspectives of fusion center leadership, will help to determine whether changes 
to the National Network are warranted. 
The research addresses and evaluates the benefits, issues, and overall viability of 
three legal mechanisms that could be used to facilitate legal uniformity. The research 
identifies which legal mechanisms are able to address the described shortcomings of the 
existing legal framework, as well as which legal mechanisms satisfy the desires of the 
stakeholders within the National Network. The results provide the National Network a 
better understanding of the collective concerns of fusion center leaders and allows the 
National Network to evaluate a course of action that addresses the concerns expressed by 
its membership. 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research method includes a review of various federal and state laws related to 
intelligence and information sharing, relevant government reports, professional papers, 
and academic journals. Due to the limited literature addressing the lack of legal 
uniformity within the National Network, exploratory interviews of fusion center 
directors, deputy directors, and senior leaders were conducted to understand their 
perspectives on legal uniformity. The interviews were used to gain insight into the 
existing state and national legal frameworks that impact the National Network and 
whether the existing frameworks present problems in the operation of each fusion center. 
The research also draws on the author’s professional experiences as an attorney for a 
fusion center within the National Network. 
Eleven confidential and semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore the 
research questions. The process for the selection of interview candidates began by 
                                                 
5 The Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board has reviewed this paper: 
NPS.2017.0046-IR-EP7-A.  
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requesting interviews from the Executive Board of the National Fusion Center 
Association (NFCA), a nonprofit organization dedicated to representing the interests of 
the National Network. The Executive Board of the NFCA consists of 12 fusion center 
directors, deputy directors, and senior leadership who operate fusion centers within the 
National Network. Five of the 12 NFCA Executive Board members agreed to be 
interviewed. Another six interviews were obtained through recommendations of the 
interviewees and through professional contacts within the National Network. The 11 
interviewees participating in this research consisted of seven fusion center directors, three 
deputy directors, and one member of senior leadership (see Table 1). Interviewee 
representation came from seven state-run fusion centers and four major urban-area fusion 
centers, providing a representative sample of leadership perspectives from both state and 
local government entities. With interviews from 11 different fusion centers, this research 
sample represents the viewpoints of 13.9 percent of the 79 fusion centers within the 
National Network. 
Table 1. Summary of Interviewee Data 
 State or Major Urban-Area 
Fusion Center 
Director, Deputy Director, or 
Senior Leadership 
Interviewee #1 State Director 
Interviewee #2 State Director 
Interviewee #3 State Director 
Interviewee #4 Major Urban Area Director 
Interviewee #5 Major Urban Area Deputy Director 
Interviewee #6 Major Urban Area Director 
Interviewee #7 State Deputy Director 
Interviewee #8 State Director 
Interviewee #9 State Senior Leadership 
Interviewee #10 State Deputy Director 
Interviewee #11 Major Urban Area Director 
 
The interviewees were questioned about four distinct areas of fusion center 
operations to determine the impact of non-uniformity: 1) the form of legal establishment 
of their fusion center and how it affects operations, 2) the impact of existing state laws on 
information sharing within the state and across state lines, 3) the types of laws that would 
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be most desirable if a national legal framework were developed, and 4) their opinions as 
to whether the federal or state governments should dictate the national legal framework 
for fusion centers, if developed. The results were used to create criteria to evaluate the 
appropriateness of three legal mechanisms selected by the author based on professional 
observations, legal research, and interview results. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II provides an overview of 
fusion centers, the National Network, and the challenges that the lack of legal uniformity 
creates within the network from the perspectives of the interviewees. Chapter III evaluates 
three legal mechanisms that have the potential to achieve legal uniformity in the National 
Network: 1) the development of model laws, 2) the development of federal laws, and 3) the 
development of a congressionally approved interstate compact. The exploratory interviews 
of fusion center directors, deputy directors, and senior leaders were utilized to establish 
criteria to evaluate each legal mechanism based on the needs and concerns that exist within 
the National Network. The application of the interviewees’ criteria led to the conclusion 
that an interstate compact would best address the lack of legal uniformity within the 
National Network. Chapter IV provides an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
utilizing an interstate compact to create uniformity within the National Network. Lastly, 
Chapter V presents three recommendations for the National Network and provides 
concluding thoughts on the results of the research.  
 6 
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II. THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF FUSION CENTERS TODAY: 
AN EVALUATION OF THE STATUS QUO 
As the United States faces evolving threats from foreign actors and home-grown 
violent extremists, the National Network serves as a state and local partner to the federal 
government in combating crime and terrorism-related threats. The National Network, 
through its 79 strategically placed fusion centers, provides access to more than two 
million public safety professionals from across the country, offering a unique 
understanding of their individual communities and providing unprecedented access to 
local intelligence.6 The information gathered from this vast public safety community 
allows the National Network to address and disseminate information on local threats that 
otherwise would have been outside the jurisdiction of the federal government. This 
access serves as a considerable benefit to the federal government in ensuring national 
security, as intelligence is able to flow up to federal officials from the state and local 
authorities.7 
The 9/11 Commission Report made clear that the federal government had access 
to information related to the terrorists who committed the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks before they occurred. However, the inability to connect the disparate information 
among government entities was the true impediment to detection and prevention.8 The 
9/11 Commission ultimately recommended the creation of information-sharing 
procedures for enhanced collaboration across all levels of government.9 Shortly after the 
publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), DHS in partnership with the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
                                                 
6 Justin Lewis Abold, Ray Guidetti, and Douglas Keyer, “Strengthening the Value of the National 
Network of Fusion Centers by Leveraging Specialization: Defining ‘Centers of Analytical Excellence,’” 
Homeland Security Affairs 8 (June 2012), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/223. 
7 “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 
26, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Fusion%20Centers%20Handout.pdf. 
8 National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission), The 9/11 
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
(New York: Norton, 2004), 416. 
9 9/11 Commission, 416–417. 
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began to fund and foster the development of state and major urban-area fusion centers 
across the United States.10 The state and major urban-area fusion centers were designed 
to operate as a network, contributing state and local intelligence to one another, the 
federal government, and the U.S. Intelligence Community. The National Network is a 
“self organizing, self governing network that operates on a foundation of common 
purpose and trusted relationships.”11 This function provides the tools needed to detect 
and prevent bad actors from compromising the safety of our nation. No other state or 
local government agency has the diversity of personnel, the unique access to frontline 
public safety employees, and the broad mission of protecting the homeland. 
A. “IF YOU HAVE SEEN ONE FUSION CENTER, YOU HAVE SEEN ONE 
FUSION CENTER” 
There is no defined model for fusion centers. Many centers are run by state and 
local public safety entities, such as an intelligence division of a state or local police 
agency. While some fusion centers focus solely on counterterrorism, many others are 
considered “all crimes, all hazards” centers, which serve a more integrated role with local 
law enforcement and public safety entities. The mission areas and budget for each fusion 
center are dictated by the needs of each community and their state or local government 
(within the parameters of federal funding and guidance, if applicable). Fusion centers are 
staffed by state and local personnel but often have a federal presence within the center to 
facilitate and enhance information sharing across all levels of government. As described 
by DHS, “Fusion centers operate as state and major urban area focal points for the 
receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between federal; 
state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT); and private sector partners.”12 The ability of fusion 
                                                 
10 Christopher C. Mitchiner, “Department of Homeland Security and Fusion Centers, an Unfused 
Network” (master’s thesis, United States Army War College, 2013), 4, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/ 
u2/a589473.pdf. 
11 National Fusion Center Association, 2014–2017 National Strategy for the National Network of 
Fusion Centers (Arlington, VA: National Fusion Center Association, July 2014), 9, https://nfcausa.org/ 
html/National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf. 
12 “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 
26, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers. 
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centers to provide a local perspective to a statewide, regional, or national homeland 
security issue fills a security gap that existed before 9/11. 
Although law enforcement typically plays a critical role in the administration of 
fusion centers, law enforcement is not the only discipline contributing to the fusion center 
mission. In addition to the contributions of law enforcement, fusion centers often include 
representation from fire services, emergency services, transportation, corrections, 
information security, parole/probation officers, school districts, and health departments. 
Such diverse and collaborative relationships position fusion centers to offer varied types 
of intelligence unlike any other single government entity. As a result, fusion centers use 
their broad level of expertise to identify and analyze relevant intelligence and disseminate 
it to local, state, and federal partners with the intention of preventing criminal and/or 
terrorist activity. 
Because there is no defined model for a fusion center’s mission and composition, 
no two fusion centers in the National Network are exactly alike. The resulting diversity 
among fusion centers has both advantages and disadvantages. One considerable 
advantage is the ability for each center to serve the specific needs of its individual 
communities. Some of the disadvantages of non-uniformity include an imprecise and 
varied mission across the National Network; an assortment of policies and procedures 
affecting the operation of each center; varied compliance with constitutional 
requirements; and numerous state laws regarding privacy, public records, open meetings, 
and law enforcement–related laws. When asked about the varied responsibilities of fusion 
centers across the country, Interviewee #6 shared, “If you go across the fusion center 
network, it’s a hodgepodge of what each fusion center director has a responsibility of 
doing. . . . There’s no real good definition of what is the role of a fusion center director or 
deputy director [and] their supervising intelligence analysts.”13 This variation creates 
operational inconsistencies within the National Network and has the ability to impact the 
functionality of services across state lines, as well as the level of predictability and trust 
between fusion centers. 
                                                 
13 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview with author, October 6, 2017. 
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1. The Value of State Statutory Authority 
Interviewees were asked to describe the enabling legislation for their fusion 
center, if any, and how any existing state law impacts their daily operations. If no state 
legislation exists, interviewees were asked to describe how their fusion center was 
created (e.g., executive order, established within an existing agency, or other) and what 
impact the form of creation has on their daily operations. These questions were asked to 
gauge how many fusion centers have state laws that explicitly dictate their operations and 
how the existing laws, or lack thereof, affect the fusion center’s ability to carry out its 
mission to “detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist related 
activity.”14 
The interviews and subsequent legal research revealed that approximately 10 
percent of the 79 fusion centers are specifically named in state law.15 It was clear from 
the interviews that many fusion centers felt they were functioning at a disadvantage 
because of the lack of specific legal authority for fusion center operations. Although three 
interviewees felt comfortable with existing state laws and authorities, the other eight 
expressed concerns over the lack of statutory authority for fusion center activities and 
records. Interviewee #3 explained that their fusion center has always had an interest in 
being statutorily created but to date had been unsuccessful in convincing its leadership 
and the state legislature to enact fusion center–specific laws. When asked to explain the 
benefits of having a fusion center established in state law, Interviewee #3 stated, 
I think any time that you can gain assistance from state law . . . it really 
solidifies what you’re doing and why you’re doing it. Whereas opinion . . . 
it may justify in my mind why I’m doing what I’m doing, but it may not 
be enough to convince let’s say a judge or somebody that’s going to 
matter down the road.16 
                                                 
14 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Baseline Capabilities for Fusion 
Centers (Washington, DC: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Justice, 
September 2008), 47–48, https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/baseline%20capabilities%20for%20state%20and% 
20major%20urban%20area%20fusion%20centers.pdf. 
15 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 52–47 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39G.050 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 48–3702 (West 2017); IND. CODE 10-11-9-2 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN., § 35-3-201 (West 
2016); and TEX. CODE ANN. § 421.082 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. § 651-F:1 (West 2010). 
16 Interviewee #3 (state director), confidential interview with author, September 21, 2017. 
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Several interviewees expressed that clarity of state law would help guide the policies and 
practices of the fusion center, ensure funding to support the centers, and limit the liability 
that fusion centers currently face due to the lack of clear legal guidance as to their day-to-
day operations.  
Interviewees were asked whether the existing state statutes in their jurisdiction 
allowed them to feel secure in their operations. Interviewee #3 shared the following: 
I believe we can sufficiently operate with what we have now because we 
have been [here] for almost 10 years. However, do I feel vulnerable? I do 
feel like we are vulnerable. I feel like . . . more specific statutes relative to 
exactly what we are doing would definitely benefit us, protect us more, as 
well as protect our information sharing environment and enable us to be 
able to share information more efficiently.17 
Similarly, Interviewee #1 shared that there was no loss of sleep over the existing legal 
framework, but the National Network could be doing a better job with stronger laws for 
fusion centers, explaining that a couple of areas are weaker than they should be.18 
Interviewee #1 also explained that public records laws are the biggest frustration for their 
fusion center because the law is unclear, and they are forced to rely on their attorneys, 
who have varied levels of understanding of the fusion center mission and how to apply 
existing laws to public records requests.19 A number of interviewees commented that the 
amount of time and effort spent determining how to respond to public record requests 
was due to the lack of clarity in the law. 
a. Public Records 
State public records laws ensure that each government is open and transparent for 
its citizens. As a matter of state law, each state government handles public records and 
any related exceptions and exemptions pursuant to the laws established by each 
independent state legislature. Public records laws can present unique challenges for the 
National Network because the laws do not always consider the sensitive nature of the 
                                                 
17 Interviewee #3. 
18 Interviewee #1 (state director), confidential interview with author, September 14, 2017. 
19 Interviewee #1. 
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records maintained by fusion centers, as public records laws were codified long before 
fusion centers were developed. Additionally, since each state follows its own public 
records law, shared information is treated differently, leaving fusion centers unsure of 
how information will be treated once it crosses state lines. 
Many state public records laws require the disclosure of all government 
documents absent a specific exception in statute. Since the majority of fusion centers are 
not established in state law, there is typically no specific exception to the public records 
law that would apply to a fusion center, leaving fusion centers unsure as to the 
confidentiality of certain documents generated and/or received by the center. For 
example, most fusion centers receive suspicious activity reports that contain 
uncorroborated information describing observed behavior “reasonably indicative of pre-
operational planning associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.”20 Suspicious 
activity reports are not typically considered active criminal investigations under state law, 
yet they still contain sensitive information related to allegedly suspicious behavior that, if 
disclosed to the public, would be detrimental to a fusion center’s mission. Furthermore, 
should the information be made publicly available, it could be potentially damaging to 
U.S. citizens who are associated with suspicious behavior even though there is 
insufficient evidence to justify a criminal investigation. There are generally inadequate 
exceptions in state law to prevent the release of a suspicious activity report, and as a 
result, fusion centers face considerable uncertainty as to the proper handling of these 
records when requested in a public records request. The interviews revealed varied 
approaches to the handling of public records requests related to suspicious activity reports 
due to inconsistent laws throughout the National Network. 
The majority of interviewees expressed that their state public records laws do not 
contain any specific exceptions for fusion center records, aside from the law 
enforcement–related statutes that deem active criminal investigations confidential. The 
lack of public record exceptions in state law leaves fusion centers to make public policy 
                                                 
20 Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, Information Sharing Environment: 
Suspicious Activity Reporting, ISE-FS-200, version 1.5.5 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, February 2015), 4, https://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/SAR_FS_1.5.5_PMISE.pdf. 
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arguments that explain that the risk of releasing the record outweighs the benefits of 
disclosure. In other words, fusion centers may respond to a specific public record 
requests by saying that it may result in harm to their mission, their employees, or 
innocent citizens. Although fusion centers are concerned about the lack of public records 
exceptions, a majority of the interviewees explained that their fusion center had never 
been challenged in court to disclose records believed to be confidential; Interviewee #1 
stated that they have “lucked out” when it comes to public records requests.21 As a result, 
little is known about how state courts will rule on these issues and the public policy 
arguments, if and when those cases are ever adjudicated in state court. The absence of 
legal challenges related to public records also seems to provide a false sense of security 
to the interviewees when it comes to the vulnerability of each fusion center, given the 
existing legal framework. 
The interviewees were asked whether fusion center records should have public 
records exceptions in law. Interviewee #3 explained that certain fusion center records 
should be made confidential: “Anything that has to do with our procedure, our tactics, 
anything having to do with ongoing investigations, anything that has to do with our 
partner agencies and their interests regarding those specific things is . . . important.”22 
Interviewee #10, agreed, adding that confidentiality of certain fusion center records is 
important because producing these records “can give out the techniques we utilize to 
identify suspicious activity or how we vet suspicious activity, which would allow the 
public to exploit and work around our techniques. The different tools that we have . . . 
would let certain parts of the public . . . exploit it and work around it.”23 There were also 
concerns from interviewees about wanting the ability to protect members of the public 
who are named in suspicious activity reports when there is no additional evidence of 
wrongdoing, fearing that the production of those records might harm those individuals in 
their careers and lives.24 
                                                 
21 Interviewee #1 (state director), confidential interview. 
22 Interviewee #3 (state director), confidential interview. 
23 Interviewee #10 (state deputy director), confidential interview with author, November 8, 2017. 
24 Interviewee #9 (state senior leadership), confidential interview with author, November 1, 2017. 
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b. Open Meeting Laws 
Open meeting laws are state statutes that require public bodies—as defined in 
state law—to hold their meetings in public, with adequate notice to the public, providing 
opportunities for the public to speak, and with transcripts that allow the public to inspect 
meeting minutes. The purpose of open meeting laws is to ensure that the public has 
access to the actions and deliberations of public bodies and the ability to make their 
opinions of those body’s actions known. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. 
territories have open meeting laws. The complication of open meeting laws in the fusion 
center environment relates to whether the content is appropriate for public consumption. 
Because fusion centers often deal with sensitive information, and their advisory or 
governance boards are involved in operational guidance, the requirement to meet in 
public to discuss related issues can be problematic for the board members. Interviewees 
reported that the public nature of an advisory or governance body meeting quells open 
discussion of legitimate operational issues and prevents the boards from addressing 
legitimate issues facing the fusion center for fear of compromising an investigation or 
disclosing critical law enforcement techniques or strategies. 
The 11 interviewees all agreed there would be benefits to allowing fusion centers 
to meet and discuss their operations in private. There appeared to be a common 
perception of why public meetings are not appropriate for all fusion center matters: the 
public nature of the meeting ceases participation and impacts the ability of the 
governance or advisory body to solve problems. When asked about whether their fusion 
center advisory body experienced any issues due to the requirement to conduct public 
meetings, Interviewee # 3 stated, 
It would really benefit the fusion center if we were able to have open 
conversation about sensitive information sometimes. Because we don’t 
have a governance board, we have an advisory board. So what I’m seeking 
from them is their advice. I’m asking for them to help me move this fusion 
center in a positive direction—and help them to help me understand what 
their needs are too, because they come from different agencies that are 
partner agencies. Well, we can’t discuss certain cases. We can’t discuss 
classified information certainly under any circumstances in an open 
meeting type situation because everything that’s talked about in a meeting 
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is open to the public. So we have to be very, very guarded as to what kind 
of information we can talk about with this advisory board.25 
In other words, the public nature of the advisory body impacts the productivity of the 
fusion center because certain information that fusion centers want to discuss with the 
advisory body cannot be discussed in a public setting and, because of the open meeting 
law, cannot be discussed in private. As a result of this complication, Interviewee #3 
described the need for fusion center exceptions in the state’s open meeting law as their 
jurisdiction’s top legislative priority.26 Interviewee #6, whose advisory body meets 
privately, echoed similar concerns to Interviewee #3, relating to the ability of the 
advisory body to address fusion center issues in a public setting: “In the fusion center 
operations, you’re dealing with either investigative or intelligence information or data. 
And no one’s gonna want to talk about that in a public session for fear of compromising 
investigations.”27 Although the majority of interviewees felt that fusion center advisory 
or governance bodies should meet privately, two interviewees had opposing views. 
Interviewee #10 shared a different perspective on whether a fusion center’s 
advisory body should meet in public, noting their advisory body meets publicly and it has 
not caused any productivity issues: “There’s nothing being said in these meetings that the 
public couldn’t hear. . . . They are more of an opportunity for the board members to hear 
[how] some of our staffing is going. I provide a couple examples of success stories that 
we’ve done and how intelligence has supported an operation.”28 Interviewee #10 went on 
to say that if the public were to show up at the meetings, remarks would be tailored for 
the audience.29 Sharing a similar sentiment, Interviewee #1 explained that their fusion 
center’s advisory body meets in public, and nobody from the public has ever attended one 
of their meetings; as a result, the law does not impact their ability to have open 
                                                 
25 Interviewee #3 (state director), confidential interview. 
26 Interviewee #3. 
27 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
28 Interviewee #10 (state deputy director), confidential interview. 
29 Interviewee #10. 
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discussions.30 It is noteworthy that most open records laws require that public meetings 
be recorded and have transcripts available to the public. Therefore, although the public 
does not attend the meetings in person, the minutes are likely still available to the public 
if requested, which may be leading to a false sense of confidence about the 
confidentiality of the comments made at Interviewee #1’s and Interviewee #10’s advisory 
or governance body meetings. 
The interviews reflect that advisory and governance bodies play varying roles 
across the National Network. Based on these varying roles as well as the existing state 
laws or lack thereof, open meeting laws impact each fusion center in different ways. 
Some fusion centers are permitted to meet privately while others are required to meet in 
public. Regardless of the existing law in each state, every interviewee understood the 
need for the fusion center advisory and governance bodies to discuss fusion center 
operations outside the public’s view to address issues and find solutions to sensitive 
problems. 
c. Funding 
The National Network is partially funded by the federal government through the 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). The HSGP is a preparedness grant that 
supports state and local activities to “prevent terrorism and other catastrophic events.”31 
Each state is eligible to receive HSGP funding, and the funding may be allocated to 
enhance the operation of recognized fusion centers within each state. The funding is 
ultimately distributed through a process developed by each jurisdiction related to the 
state’s prioritization of funding. HSGP grant guidance is the mechanism used by the 
federal government to maintain oversight and mandate some uniformity within the 
National Network, as every eligible recipient of HSGP funding must agree to comply 
                                                 
30 Interviewee #1 (state director), confidential interview. 
31 Shawn Reese, Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues, 
CRS Report No. R44669 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 5, https://fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/homesec/R44669.pdf. 
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with certain laws, regulations, and policies dictated by the federal government.32 Many 
of the laws required by the HSGP are federal in nature and would not be applicable to 
state and local governments absent the fusion center’s decision to accept federal grant 
funding and its related requirements. However, it is important to note that a fusion 
center’s agreement to comply with federal laws, regulations, and policies through the 
HSGP does not excuse state or major urban-area fusion centers from complying with 
state and local laws in their jurisdictions. The multi-jurisdictional legal requirements may 
result in legal conflict and confusion related to applicable laws and standards. 
Although the federal government has an interest in the success of the National 
Network, not only as the supplier of significant federal funding but also as a recipient of 
the intelligence compiled by state and major urban-area fusion centers, the combination 
of federal and state resources presents challenges related to the management, operation, 
and the legal authority for most, if not all, of the fusion centers in the National Network. 
As federal funding available through the HSGP continues to decrease, state and local 
governments must increase their contributions to support the operation of their fusion 
centers in order to maintain their level of service. 
At least two interviewees expressed that the primary value of state statutory 
authority is the ability to access state funding.33 Absent established statutory authority, 
fusion centers struggle to gain the state funding they need to function without primary 
reliance on the federal government. Moreover, with the continued reduction of funding 
coming from the federal government through the HSGP, the ability to access state 
statutory funding is becoming increasingly more relevant to ensure the survival of each 
fusion center in the National Network. In defense of this position, Interviewee #5 stated 
that the ability to gain funding is the most important benefit of state statutory creation: 
                                                 
32 Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2017 Homeland Security Grant Program,” DHS-
17-GPD-067-00-01 (Notice of Funding Opportunity, Department of Homeland Security, 2016), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1496691855715-4d78d65ebb300900ce6c945931eff2c6/FY_ 
2017_HSGP_NOFO_20170601v2014_605.pdf. 
33 Interviewee #5 (major urban-area deputy director), confidential interview with author, September 
22, 2017; and Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
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The [XXXX], along with other fusion centers, operate under federal 
grants, specifically the Urban Area Security Initiative, the UASI, and the 
State Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSP, and with fluctuation, 
obviously, in the economy and funding and moneys towards federal 
grant[s], we operate on strictly one, on federal grants, and second, on in-
kind donations, meaning local participating agencies provide bodies 
through their in-kind funds for their personnel. And we have seen a 
decrease in federal funding, and essentially having a codified law would 
actually provide continuous support and funding.34 
Interviewee #3 shared a similar explanation for the value of state law in funding the 
fusion center, stating that state law provides “more footing when it comes to seeking 
funding for your fusion center. . . . It also helps with your decision-making as far as 
coming to the table with how you see the fusion center moving forward in a positive 
direction.”35 In other words, Interviewee #3 feels having a statute that establishes a 
center in law will make it easier to request and justify funding from the state legislature. 
Considering the significant reductions in fusion center funding from the HSGP over the 
last 10 years, the ability to acquire state funding may become more important, justifying 
additional attention to develop state statutory authority for the long-term survival of the 
National Network. 
2. The Impact of Non-uniformity within the National Network 
One of the purposes of the exploratory interviews was to understand how the lack 
of national legal uniformity impacts information sharing within the National Network, 
since fusion centers are expected to effectively and efficiently share information and 
intelligence across state lines. Information sharing is the process by which fusion centers 
share relevant information with one another and the federal government on matters of 
local or national concern.36 The basic information-sharing process includes the receipt of 
information, the analysis of the information, and the dissemination of threat-related 
                                                 
34 Interviewee #5 (major urban-area deputy director), confidential interview. 
35 Interviewee #3 (state director), confidential interview. 
36 National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, National Strategy for Information Sharing: 
Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism Related Information Sharing (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, October 2007), 1, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=480495. 
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information.37 The interviewees shared many of the same concerns related to record 
management since every state defines public records and designates sensitive documents 
differently. Although the National Network is deemed a “network” by name, there is no 
reported predictability as to how confidential or sensitive records will be handled across 
state lines, absent taking the time to research the laws in other states before sending 
information or intelligence to another fusion center. 
When asked about the importance of uniformity, Interviewee #8 explained that 
the National Network is not a traditional network but rather a unique interrelationship 
between numerous sovereign governments: “To be a network, we have to operate like 
one, but it’s not like the network of the Department of Defense intelligence. I mean, it’s 
always going to be a network comprised of 79 separate state governments and in some 
cases local governments. That is, in fact, what we are going to have to contend with.”38 
The majority of interview responses support the concept of creating uniformity among 
fusion centers for the ease and speed of information sharing within the National Network. 
Interviewee #6 summarized the goal of the National Network: “We’re trying to all work 
as a network, not as individuals all trying to swim together.”39 In order to improve 
information sharing, the interviewees discussed the following areas that need to be 
addressed in the information-sharing environment to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency within the National Network. 
a. Non-Uniformity in Public Records Laws 
An emerging area of concern within the National Network includes the 
disposition of fusion center records outside their originating state. Since every state has 
different public records laws that impact government and fusion center records, there is 
uncertainty as to how one state’s records will be handled once the records are sent to 
                                                 
37 Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing—DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center 
Capabilities and Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers, 
GAO-15-155 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014), 8–9, http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/670/666760.pdf. 
38 Interviewee #8 (state director), confidential interview with author, October 17, 2017. 
39 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
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another state. Interviewee #5 explained that a particular state fusion center uses a 
disclaimer on emails to inform other fusion centers that once it receives records from 
them, the records are considered public under state law.40 When asked whether they 
believed that the inability for the particular state to protect information shared from other 
fusion centers affected the National Network, Interviewee #5 acknowledged that the 
disclaimer did cause hesitation from fusion centers when sharing information: “I 
remember their director told us specific [sic], all of us, like, I’ll tell you right now that 
what you’re sending me is going to go public. So, now many centers are very hesitant and 
cognizant of what they are sending over to them.”41 Other interviewees were asked 
whether public record disclaimers were affecting the way fusion centers share 
information. While none of the interviewees said it changed their willingness to share 
information, many said it caused hesitation and insecurity. 
Interviewee #6 explained that for a fusion center to be fully informed of all public 
records laws applicable within the National Network, it would have to know the public 
records requirements in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as any local ordinance that affects each major urban-area 
fusion center.42 The interviewees believed that understanding the national public records 
framework would be too complicated and too time consuming for the National Network 
to learn while conducting its mission in an effective and efficient manner.43 When asked 
about the impact of non-uniformity in public records laws, Interviewee #6 stated, “It’s 
too damn confusing to figure out because besides the state laws, they have local 
ordinances. And trying to keep up with 78 different state statutes, local ordinances, or 
whatever they’re following, it’s a mess.”44 
Interviewee #1 acknowledged that a fusion center should probably know the state 
laws of information-sharing recipients but admitted that it slows down the process too 
                                                 
40 Interviewee #5 (major urban-area deputy director), confidential interview. 
41 Interviewee #5. 
42 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
43 Interviewee #5; and Interviewee #6. 
44 Interviewee #6. 
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much.45 Other interviewees were more dismissive of questions related to whether they 
research laws in other states before sending records across state lines, implying the 
absurdity of the expectation that fusion centers have the time to do legal research while 
conducting their mission. Interviewee #9 stated, 
No, we do not research [laws] and it does not concern us. We’re gonna 
share the information with them and hope that they would not release our 
information without talking to us, but if they’re required to do so under 
their state law, then that’s just the way it is. We’re not gonna concern 
ourselves with the 49 states’ laws because it’d be impossible to do that and 
then you would restrict the flow of information.46 
In an information-sharing environment where time can be of the essence, the non-
uniformity of law creates complexities for fusion centers that cannot be easily or quickly 
addressed. While many of the interviewees described the consequences of information 
sharing in 54 legal frameworks as the “risk of doing business,” consideration of the legal 
implications seemed non-consequential since very few of the interviewees’ fusion centers 
have been legally challenged in the appropriateness of their handling of public records. 
b. Non-Uniformity in Data Classification 
Another area of concern from the standpoint of national uniformity is related to 
the use of document designations like Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES), For Official 
Use Only (FOUO), and Classified. These designations are also utilized at the federal 
government level and serve as internal controls to easily identify sensitive information 
and quickly determine the permissible recipients. The interviews revealed that the 
document designations are used by every fusion center represented in the interview 
sample, and the designations assist the fusion centers in classifying records based on who 
should have access to each record. Every interviewee explained that the document 
designations were not established in state law, but defined in policy. When asked about 
the meaning of LES in their fusion center’s jurisdiction, Interviewee #6 shared, 
                                                 
45 Interviewee #1 (state director), confidential interview. 
46 Interviewee #9 (state senior leader), confidential interview. 
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It doesn’t mean anything anywhere…other than [XXXXXX] law; there 
are no statutes out there that give any bearing to LES data. It is just a 
made-up thing even in the federal system. So, just because we call it LES, 
which to us means something that’s PII [we] don’t want to get [it] out into 
the non-law enforcement world. There is no standardization.47 
The lack of standardization proves difficult for the National Network when trying 
to understand how a shared record should be treated when it crosses state lines. If every 
state has different definition of LES, FOUO, or Classified, Fusion Center A may handle a 
record quite differently than Fusion Center B. It was explained that some states allow 
non–law enforcement employees to view LES information based on their responsibilities 
within the fusion center while other states exclude non–law enforcement employees from 
seeing LES records.48 Furthermore, some fusion centers within the National Network are 
not run by law enforcement agencies, complicating the ability of fusion centers to share 
information with them based on document designation definitions.49 When asked 
whether it would be valuable for the National Network to have the terms LES, FOUO, 
and Classified defined in national law, Interviewee #6 responded, 
Oh, absolutely. It has to be. We have to one day get to that point where it 
is, because without it, you’re left in this chaotic situation where you’re not 
sure [what] you can share. And you’re also left in a position where there 
are people that, in the mindsets of folks, should not have this data, but they 
have got it in their hands and how do you pull it away from them.50 
The interviewees explained that because every state defines these classifications 
differently, a document classified as LES in one state may be made available to non–law 
enforcement entities and their employees in another state.51 As the interviewees 
suggested, in some states, the ability to access information is more about professional 
title rather than work responsibility, which Interviewee #6 believes is responsible for the 
                                                 
47 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
48 Interviewee #6. 
49 Interviewee #5 (major urban-area deputy director), confidential interview. 
50 Interviewee #6. 
51 Interviewee #6. 
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degradation of the information-sharing environment since the National Network is 
comprised of both law enforcement and non–law enforcement entities: 
When you talk about the classification of data, that’s one piece. The other 
piece is how you classify the groups that received the data. . . . on the law 
enforcement side, it’s become at least fairly easy, but we still have those 
anomalies like the five fusion centers in the country that don’t have direct 
law enforcement telecommunication, national criminal information center 
data access. Those are problematic because we don’t define this as a class 
of people based on their need and right to know that should have this data. 
We think that fusion centers should be one of those groups.52 
Interviewee #6 emphasized the importance of ensuring that information is shared with the 
right people, regardless of position or title, providing another argument for uniformity 
across the National Network. Data classification and data access are inconsistent due to 
the variation in fusion center roles and responsibilities throughout the National Network, 
as well as varying definitions of document classifications, creating a challenging 
environment for effective information sharing. 
c. Non-Uniformity and Its Impact on Trust 
In a network environment, trust among the participants is critical to information 
sharing. For example, Fusion Center A needs to trust that Fusion Center B will handle its 
records lawfully and appropriately when sharing information across state lines. But in a 
network that consists of 54 different legal frameworks, trust is difficult to establish and 
maintain because of the ongoing uncertainty of how fusion centers outside the originating 
jurisdiction will handle sensitive information and intelligence. Many of the interviewees 
mentioned that trust is critical to the National Network’s success. When asked about the 
impact of non-uniformity in the National Network, Interviewee #6 stated, 
It’s all built on trust. So, you can’t be effective without a huge amount of 
trust with each other because we are coordinating highly sensitive data 
[and] people’s lives are at risk. And it’s hard to be effective if there’s any 
hesitation, and we have that. We have states say, well, I can’t send you 
this unless you sign this five page agreement every time I send you 
something. And that is the craziest thing I’ve ever seen in my life, but it’s 
going on right now where there are these agreements that are going back 
                                                 
52 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
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and forth, non-disclosure agreements every time you ask for something, 
which isn’t efficient or effective at all.53 
There may be some question as to how effective a non-disclosure agreement would be 
when the terms of the agreement are inconsistent with state law, but the interviewees 
revealed that these agreements are frequently used within the National Network. In 
addition to having questionable application, the interviewees seem frustrated by the 
inefficiency of the process. 
Interviewee #3 stated that, within the National Network, “trust is ultimately the 
name of the game,” expressing concerns and vulnerability about how fusion center data 
would be handled when sent across states lines.54 But Interviewee #3 also spoke about 
how trust in the National Network is bigger than the issue between two disparate fusion 
centers; the issue of trust also impacts the local law enforcement agencies that contribute 
information to each fusion center:  
We are going to these people, and we’re going to these agencies, and 
we’re saying, yes we’re an information sharing environment, we are part 
of the intelligence community . . . you can trust us. If you give us 
information, you can trust us with that information. And we want to be 
able to make sure that they in fact can trust us with that information.55 
In other words, Interviewee #3 highlights that in addition to the trust needed between 
state and major urban-area fusion centers, trust is also relevant to each fusion center’s 
relationship with local law enforcement agencies. Fusion centers depend heavily on the 
local law enforcement’s input into the information-sharing environment, and Interviewee 
#3 shared that the local law enforcement entities need to trust how their information is 
handled within the National Network once it is shared with their fusion center. Therefore, 
uniformity in law would not only benefit fusion centers directly; it would also benefit the 
local law enforcement agencies that contribute critical information to each center. The 
more local law enforcement agencies trust their fusion centers, the more likely they will 
be to share valuable information and intelligence. 
                                                 
53 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
54 Interviewee #3 (state director), confidential interview. 
55 Interviewee #3. 
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Interviewee #7 expressed similar concerns about the impact of sharing 
information obtained from law enforcement partners without the security in law to protect 
their information. The result may be an uncomfortable conversation with a contributing 
jurisdiction, explaining that its records will be released in a public records response. 
So, when we get information from our law enforcement partners, they give 
us the information, we write up products, then we disseminate it. They 
have this level of trust that we’re not going to give it to the public. Then 
we get an open records request, and we do. So I don’t always get a say in 
it, but I tell them, I say, please call the Chief or Sheriff of that department 
and explain the situation because we don’t want to destroy that trust with 
this agency where they’re never gonna give us information again.56 
Interviewee #7 went on to say “if people don’t trust you, you’re not gonna be part of the 
network.”57 The interviews reflect that the expectation of the law enforcement partners is 
not always consistent with the legal protections granted to each fusion center. This 
uncertainty appears to concern the interviewees, since law enforcement agencies are a 
critical partner in the information-sharing environment. Interviewee #8 stated, 
The bottom line is that we’ve been operating off of gentlemen’s 
agreements. . . . There is a sense of duty that we’re giving to one another 
to try to ensure that we protect each other’s information and we protect the 
network’s ability to reliably share information back and forth, but there’s 
also a realization that there are certain states that if somebody goes after 
your information in another state, chances are there is nothing—all the 
well intentions that fusion center might have, there’s really nothing that 
you can do to stop that release.58 
The interviews reflect a sense of responsibility to protect the information received 
from other fusion centers and law enforcement partners, but also a lack of certainty as to 
whether they can fulfill their obligations to one another under existing law. Absent 
predictability within the National Network, the ability to maintain trust with each other, 
as well as critical local law-enforcement partners, remains uncertain. 
                                                 
56 Interviewee #7 (state deputy director), confidential interview with author, October 12, 2017. 
57 Interviewee #7. 
58 Interviewee #8 (state director), confidential interview. 
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B. STATE OR FEDERAL CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL NETWORK 
The second theme derived from the research interviews is related to the 
importance of state and local control of the National Network. In order to evaluate the 
appropriate structure of governance, one must consider the principles of federalism and 
how it impacts this analysis. Federalism is the shared power between the federal 
government and the state governments with the respective division of power outlined in 
the U.S. Constitution.59 Amendment 10 of the Constitution reads, “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” As a result of the enumerated 
powers outlined in the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those 
powers, the states generally retain control over local concerns and the federal government 
retains control over national concerns.60 Although national security falls within the 
purview of the federal government, local police powers typically fall within the authority 
of the state governments.61 As a result, within the National Network a combination of 
national security issues and local police power issues create uncertainty as to whether 
state or federal laws apply in a variety of circumstances. 
The interviewees were asked whether they believed the National Network is 
better served by state and local government control or whether the National Network 
would be more successful under federal government oversight. This series of questions 
were designed to demonstrate the tolerance of federal government involvement in the 
National Network, which could limit the options available to create legal uniformity. 
Every interviewee expressed some level of concern related to federal government control 
of the National Network. The majority of the interviewees were adamant that the state 
and local governments were in the best position to operate the National Network due to 
their relationships with, and duties to, their local communities, highlighting that the 
                                                 
59 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–459 (1991). 
60 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
61 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–619 (2000). 
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concerns of the federal government are different than those of the state and local 
governments.62 
This [network] needs to remain in the hands of the state and locals, doing 
work that it critical to the senior executives for these law enforcement 
agencies, the public health, the emergency preparedness—and not driven 
and guided by any federal oversight or statutes. . . . I don’t want to be 
derogatory about anybody, everyone has their purpose and different 
mission, but you know . . . the framers had a great idea in separation of 
powers and states’ rights . . . and I think we need to stick with that.63 
The desire for state and local control of the network was consistent throughout all 
of the interviews with the exception of two of the interviewees, who explained that 
although they believed that state and local governments are the appropriate entities to run 
the National Network, they were also open to federal involvement if there was no other 
way to achieve national uniformity. When asked about a hypothetical federal law to 
create uniformity, Interviewee #6 stated, 
We’re at a point where if we don’t get to the next level of coordination 
where there is some federal law, that there is something across the board, 
then pieces of this network are going to fall off because people aren’t able 
to meet even minimum standards of what we think they should be able to 
do in their operation.64 
Interviewee #6 seemed to believe that national coordination is critical, but the only way 
to create national uniformity is through federal law. Coming from a similar perspective, 
Interviewee #10 admitted that choosing whether state and local governments or the 
federal government should run the National Network would be difficult but highlighted 
there are benefits to both formats.65 One benefit of federal control shared by Interviewee 
#10 was the ability for fusion centers to utilize the federal Freedom of Information Act 
exemptions related to their fusion center records.66 Although Interviewees #6 and #10 
                                                 
62 Interviewee #5 (major urban-area deputy director), confidential interview. 
63 Interviewee #11 (major urban-area director), confidential interview with author, November 20, 
2017. 
64 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
65 Interviewee #10 (state deputy director), confidential interview. 
66 Interviewee #10. 
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expressed a guarded interest in the creation of federal laws for the National Network, 
they presented the concept as the only perceived way to create true legal uniformity 
among fusion centers. 
Considering whether the network should remain under state and local government 
control or whether the National Network should cede to the federal oversight, 
Interviewee #6 explained the dilemma facing the National Network: 
It’s a hard balance because you want state and local buy-in and federal 
coordinated support, but you don’t want to put everything under the 
federal government. The reason that fusion centers are . . . successful is 
because they’re quick and adaptive. They can move to whatever the threat 
is, whatever the situation is more quickly than federal agencies can, they 
just can’t move that fast. And the threat moves faster than any of us.67 
The majority of interviewees believe that state and local governments are in the 
best position to manage and operate the National Network based on their intimate 
knowledge of their communities and the needs of their state and local partners. In 
response to a question about whether the National Network would be better served by 
federal control, Interviewee #5 stated, “What the federal government is looking at is 
completely different to what state and locals—you know, we have unique … needs. I 
think it’s important that we continue to operate at the state and local level.”68 
Interviewee #1 expressed concern that federalization of the National Network 
would lead to too much uniformity in the operation and mission of each center, which 
would ultimately lead to degradation of the partnerships and collaborative relationships 
established since 9/11 in each individual jurisdiction.69 Instead, Interviewee #1 expressed 
interest in having the individual fusion centers take more control, stating that the National 
Network needs to take “more ownership of our own destiny instead of letting DHS think 
we’re the child and they are our parent.”70 While Interviewee #2 agreed that state and 
local governments should address the lack of uniformity and related concerns, there was 
                                                 
67 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
68 Interviewee #5 (major urban-area deputy director), confidential interview. 
69 Interviewee #1 (state director), confidential interview. 
70 Interviewee #1. 
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hesitation as to whether the state and local governments have the capacity and endurance 
necessary to accomplish those meaningful changes: “The best way would be [for] state 
and locals to do it but I don’t know that state and locals have the horsepower to get it 
done.”71 
Interviewees #3 and #11 viewed this issue from the perspective of the U.S. 
Constitution and the powers granted within it. Interviewee #11 shared that the National 
Network is meant to serve more than just the needs of the federal government, 
emphasizing the role each fusion center has with its state and/or local government. The 
constitutional framework was mentioned in multiple interviews, and Interviewee #3 
shared the sentiment of wanting to preserve constitutional intentions. When asked 
whether federalization of the National Network was problematic, Interviewee #3 
explained the following: 
Obviously, it raises concerns for me . . . It’s important that each state does 
retain its sovereignty. The problem, as I see it with federalization, is 
what’s best for each entity no longer applies. [The only thing that applies] 
is whatever the federal government says is best. So it’s kind of like having 
an umbrella decide whether you’re dry or not . . . and not you deciding 
[whether] to move the umbrella left or right because [you are] not staying 
out of the rain.72 
The theme of responses to this portion of the research represented the desire by 
the majority to have state and local governments maintain their control of the National 
Network; however, palpable frustration and helplessness stems from the complex, 
overwhelming, and time-consuming problem of creating uniformity across 50 sovereign 
states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. 
C. THE NATIONAL FUSION CENTER ASSOCIATION 
Although no single government entity has oversight or control over the National 
Network as it is self-governing, the National Network does receive support and 
collaboration from the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA). The NFCA in a non-
                                                 
71 Interviewee #2 (state director), confidential interview with author, September 19, 2017. 
72 Interviewee #3 (state director), confidential interview. 
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profit association that “represent[s] the interests of state and major urban area fusion 
centers.”73 The NFCA was established in 2007 and exists to promote the value of fusion 
centers, serve as a consolidated voice to the federal government, enhance relationships 
across disparate government agencies, provide input on policies and procedures for 
fusion center operations, and advocate on behalf of the National Network to ensure that 
fusion centers receive the resources needed to be successful.74 The NFCA has an 
executive board consisting of 12 members who serve as directors, deputy directors, and 
senior leaders of recognized fusion centers within the National Network. Additionally, 
the NFCA employs an executive director and supports the association president, who is 
elected by the membership. The NFCA membership includes fusion center leadership 
from across the nation and provides a consolidated voice to support the network. As a 
service to the National Network, the NFCA hosts an annual training event each year that 
brings together fusion center employees from across the network to address complicated 
issues facing fusion centers. 
Over the years, the NFCA has expended considerable effort to enhance the 
capability of the National Network, including the development of a three-year strategy to 
serve as a guide to the network and contributions to the development of annexes to the 
Baseline Capabilities of State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.75 The executive 
leadership of the NFCA reported that uniformity is very important to the organization, 
and one interviewee said that it has tried to create uniformity where it does not require 
changes to the law.76 When asked whether the NFCA wants uniformity in the National 
Network, Interviewee #10 stated, 
I believe they do. They are continually pushing to get uniformity amongst 
different program and work groups. . . . They’ve been trying to get 
uniformity across [the nation]—they just did a project on a uniform way to 
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74 National Fusion Center Association. 
75 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview; and Interviewee #8 (state 
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request information . . . across the network. That is one example of . . . the 
steps taken as an association to get uniformity.77 
Interviewee #8 explained that the NFCA has created uniformity in its analytical 
tradecraft and operational capabilities through policies and guidelines but has fallen short 
of changing law to create uniformity due to the complexity of legislative amendments.78 
According to the interviewees, the NFCA continues to push uniformity in whatever form 
it is able to promote. As Interviewee #6 stated, uniformity is the primary focus of the 
NFCA, explaining that it is critical to get “everyone on the same page.”79 
  
                                                 
77 Interviewee #10 (state deputy director), confidential interview. 
78 Interviewee #8 (state director), confidential interview. 
79 Interviewee #6 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
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III. CREATING LEGAL UNIFORMITY: 
A COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 
The interplay of federal, state, and local law, federal guidelines, and state and 
local government administration of fusion centers can lead to complex considerations 
when it comes to the access, maintenance, and storage of criminal intelligence within the 
National Network. The ability to navigate these complicated and―at times—conflicting 
laws and policies is critical to the health and viability of the National Network and the 
foundational protections to which citizens are entitled in the U.S. Constitution. The 
exploratory interviews reflect the desire for legal uniformity, and the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine three legal mechanisms that have the potential to create legal 
uniformity to determine if they will satisfy the requirements of the stakeholders within 
the National Network. 
The legal mechanisms evaluated are model laws, federal laws, and a 
congressionally approved interstate compact. This chapter describes each method of 
establishment and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each option, as well as 
evaluates how each mechanism coincides with the criteria determined through 
interviewee responses. The criteria established by interviewees include the enactment of 
state statutory authority for their fusion center, the development of national uniformity 
within the National Network, and the continuation of state and local control of the 
National Network. The criteria are used to evaluate the legal mechanisms in this chapter 
to determine the most beneficial option for the National Network in the event that the 
network chooses to pursue legal and operational uniformity. 
In order to provide context to the interviewees’ criteria, the following descriptions 
characterize each category of evaluation. The first evaluation criterion, state statutory 
authority, is achieved when a bill is taken through the state legislative process and 
enacted into state law. The resulting state law has limited application, as it only applies in 
the state it was enacted. The benefits of state law, from the interviewees’ perspective, 
include the specific legal authority for fusion centers to conduct their mission in the state, 
the needed guidance on expectations for public records and open meeting laws in the 
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state, and the ability to secure state funding to support the existence of the center. The 
second evaluation criterion, national uniformity, is achieved when all states and 
territories operate under the same legal framework to address a shared issue. Although 
federal laws with national application are the most common example of uniformity, 
model laws and interstate compacts also have the potential to achieve uniformity, with 
varying degrees of success. The benefits of national uniformity for the National Network 
from the interviewees’ perspective include consistency in operations and predictability of 
each fusion center’s handling of issues that cross state lines. The last evaluation criterion, 
state sovereignty, is achieved when state governments are in control of their government 
and related local powers, as dictated by the U.S. Constitution and the enumerated powers 
granted to the federal government. As explained by the interviewees, the National 
Network believes that maintaining state sovereignty vis-à-vis the federal government in 
the realm of fusion center operation is not only appropriate but also constitutional. The 
cited benefits include the ability for each fusion center to serve the needs of its 
communities rather than having the majority of focus on federally dictated laws and 
policies. 
A. MODEL LAWS 
Model laws are proposed statutory schemes that are developed by a consortium of 
legal experts to facilitate regional or national legal uniformity on specific issues. The 
purpose of proposing a model law is to encourage standardization of laws across state 
lines by proposing a “best practice” for legislating a particular area of interest.80 Once 
model laws are researched, developed, and published, they serve as a legislative proposal 
that states may attempt to codify through their legislatures; however, model laws do not 
become actual laws until they have been enacted into a state statutory scheme. The state 
legislature has complete discretion to determine whether to enact a model law in its 
entirety, reject it, or choose to enact portions of it. A state legislature’s decision to enact 
only a portion of a proposed model law may be due to an existing state law that conflicts 
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with the proposed model law, which would require legislative amendment, or due to 
other state-specific concerns like the political tolerance of elected officials. 
Hundreds of model laws have been proposed by organizations like the American 
Law Institute, the American Bar Association, and the Uniform Law Commission, each 
with varied levels of success; these organizations invest significant time and effort to 
determine which areas of law are most appropriate for legal uniformity.81 One of the 
most recognizable model laws, the Model Penal Code, attempted to standardize the 
criminal code across the nation in 1962.82 To date, the complete Model Penal Code is 
not law in any single jurisdiction with the United States although three states have 
enacted nearly all of the proposed provisions.83 The Model Penal Code continues to serve 
as a guide to state legislatures that are evaluating their criminal statutes, but it cannot be 
credited with creating true legal uniformity within the United States. Also, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), which was published in 1952, serves to standardize 
commercial transactions within the United States.84 The UCC has been adopted by all 50 
states but with variations in the law.85 It has been reported that the laws related to 
commercial transactions have become less uniform over the years since state legislatures 
continue to carve out exceptions to the model law, and many states have failed to update 
the UCC as changes have been recommended.86 
Because there is no requirement to enact a model law and no legal consequence to 
changing the text of a model law, there is no legal mechanism to require uniformity, 
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resulting in a patchwork of varying state laws addressing similar issues.87 Since 
uniformity is not guaranteed with the development of a model law, model laws are not 
likely desirable in circumstances where absolute uniformity is critical to the success of 
the proposed statutory scheme. 
1. Application of Interviewee Criteria to Model Laws 
Model laws have the potential to create state statutory authority. After publication 
of a model law, it is up to each state to determine whether it wants to pursue the 
enactment of the model law through the state legislative process. If a model law or a 
version of it is enacted by a state legislature, it will have the same force of law as any 
other statute in the state. 
In theory, national uniformity through the use of model laws is possible if every 
state and territory proposes and passes the exact same model law. However, this outcome 
is unlikely due to the voluntary nature of model laws and the legislative process that must 
occur in each sovereign state and territorial government to enact legislation. The process 
tends to have legal and political ramifications that have historically prevented uniformity, 
as evidenced by the Model Penal Code and the UCC. These popular model laws have 
been published for well over 50 years and have not created legal uniformity across the 
nation. Therefore, while national uniformity is technically possible with model laws, 
history demonstrates that it is unlikely. 
Last, since the absolute power of choice as to whether to enact a model law into a 
state statutory framework—in whole, in part, or not at all—rests with each state and 
territorial government, there is no obligation to enact a model law, and there is no penalty 
if not enacted. Therefore, each state is truly autonomous and unencumbered to serve its 
own needs. Model laws respect state sovereignty and provide the benefit of state control. 
Table 2 provides a summary of interviewee criteria applied to model laws. 
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Table 2. Summary of Interviewee Criteria Applied to Model Laws88 






Model Law Yes Unlikely Yes 
 
2. The Application of Model Laws to the National Network 
The application of the interviewees’ criteria reveals that model laws clearly 
satisfy two of the three priorities of the interviewees. First, model laws may result in the 
development of state statutory authority if a model law is successfully taken through the 
legislative process and signed into law. Second, model laws respect state sovereignty by 
leaving the choice to enact a model law with each state. However, model laws 
realistically fail to fulfill one of the critical criteria asserted by the interviewees; model 
laws do not necessarily create national uniformity. Rather, each state has the option to 
enact the model law in whole, part, or not at all. The resulting variation of law would 
likely result in a similar scenario to what exists in the National Network today—a 
patchwork of state laws that are inconsistent and largely unknown to the other members 
of the network. Absent the predictability afforded by national uniformity, the investment 
of time and effort devoted to the development of a model law may not make a significant 
impact on the operational challenges currently faced by the National Network. 
The interviewees expressed concern over the complexity and political 
implications of attempting to create legal uniformity within the National Network. The 
development of a model law takes significant time and research by a group of individuals 
who are invested in the project. However, the complexity of developing the model law is 
directly related to the process. Typically, the individuals assigned to draft a model law are 
legal experts chosen to pursue the project, rather than a national collective of interested 
parties, likely resulting in a less personal process. Furthermore, since it is not mandatory 
to enact a model law, national buy-in is not a requirement, preventing delays based on 
individuals who are dissatisfied with the proposed model law. As a result, the difficulty in 
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developing a model law is somewhat limited by its voluntary nature, since national 
consensus is not required to publish it for state legislative consideration. 
Model laws have one distinct complication worth noting. A proposed model law 
may conflict with existing state laws in jurisdictions across the country, requiring 
adjustments to the model law or possible amendments of existing state laws prior to 
enactment. The process of amending a proposed model law is easier than amending 
existing state law but has a legitimate impact on whether national uniformity is achieved. 
Although legislative amendments may seem like a simple issue on paper, amending 
existing state law has numerous complexities, including political desires of state 
legislatures and the subsequent approval of each governor. The development of any law 
is a highly political process. It has not only the potential to impact a state’s ability to 
successfully enact a model law but also the ability to impact national uniformity. 
B. FEDERAL LAW 
Article 1, section 1, of the U.S. Constitution grants exclusive legislative powers to 
Congress. In other words, Congress is responsible for the enactment of federal law. 
However, it is critical to examine the U.S. federal system of government to fully explore 
the process of creating federal law for application to this research. The concept of 
federalism, which divides power between the federal and state governments, is a 
cornerstone of the U.S. system of government.89 Amendment 10 of the U.S. Constitution 
serves to limit federal government authority over the states, and, therefore, areas of 
governance not explicitly outlined within the U.S. Constitution―or determined by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as being areas of governance under federal authority―are the 
responsibility of state governments. As a result, the states tend to retain control over local 
concerns, and the federal government tends to retain control over national concerns. 
Article 1, section 7, of the U.S. Constitution outlines the process of creating 
federal law, which begins with the development of a bill. A bill is essentially an idea that 
develops into the text containing a proposed law. A bill can be introduced by any member 
of Congress, who becomes its primary sponsor. Although the path of each bill varies, 
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generally it is sent to the appropriate committee for research, edits, and a vote to 
determine whether the committee will move the bill forward in the legislative process. 
Once a bill passes through committee, the bill may be sent to subcommittee for further 
action or to the House of Representatives and the Senate for consideration. Both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate must agree on the exact same language of the 
bill by majority vote. If a bill successfully passes through Congress, it is then sent to the 
president. The president may sign the bill into law, veto the bill, or take no action on the 
bill, in which case it becomes law after 10 days. If the president vetoes a bill, the House 
of Representatives and Senate, by two-thirds vote, can override the president’s veto and 
the bill becomes law. Once a federal law is passed, it has national authority due to the 
Supremacy Clause found in article 6, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; 
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
The Supremacy Clause demands that federal laws be made consistent with the powers 
granted by the U.S. Constitution and ensures that federal laws are superior to state and local 
laws when in conflict. However, if it is felt that a federal law is inconsistent with article 6, 
clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, the judiciary, pursuant to article 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, will be left to determine whether the federal law is constitutional. 
1. Application of Interviewee Criteria to Federal Laws 
The enactment of federal law does not create any state statutory authority. Rather, 
the federal law preempts any state law that conflicts with the federal law where concurrent 
powers exist.90 Federal laws prevent not only the use of existing and conflicting state laws 
but also the state government from developing any future state laws that conflict with an 
area of governance. 
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Unlike model laws, federal laws ensure national uniformity. Federal law serves as 
the “supreme law of the land” in the particular area of governance, applying in every state 
and territory within the United States. 
Last, the creation of federal law does not maintain state sovereignty vis-à-vis the 
federal government, as it eliminates the state’s power of choice to develop and enforce laws 
in a particular area of governance. Instead, the federal law is dictated by federal 
policymakers rather than through the input of state and local stakeholders. A summary of 
interviewee criteria as applied to federal law appears in Table 3. 
Table 3. Summary of Interviewee Criteria Applied to Federal Laws91 






Federal Law  No Yes No 
  
 
2. Application of Federal Laws to the National Network 
The application of the interviewees’ criteria reveals that the development of 
federal law for the National Network would satisfy one of the three priorities of the 
interviewees. The creation of federal law for the National Network is the only option 
that ensures legal uniformity across the network, which is a high priority for the 
majority of the interviewees. However, the remaining two criteria, the creation of state 
statutory authority and the maintenance of state sovereignty, are not met by the use of 
this particular legal mechanism. Based on interviews, the resulting lack of state statutes 
and the loss of state sovereignty will likely be unacceptable to the majority of the fusion 
centers within the National Network. And although the legal and operational guidance 
requested by the interviewees may be achievable through the proposed federal law, the 
ability for fusion centers to acquire state funding through state statutory authority will 
not be realized through the creation of federal law. 
                                                 
91 Adapted from responses from Interviewees #1–11. 
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Since the majority of interviewees believe that state and local governments are 
in the best position to manage and operate the National Network based on a 
constitutional analysis and their intimate knowledge of their communities, the creation 
of federal law to govern the National Network will likely be met with significant 
resistance. Furthermore, any federal law proposed for the National Network may be met 
with constitutional challenges related to the authority of the federal government to 
govern the National Network. 
It is noteworthy that there are several challenges to developing federal law in the 
area of fusion centers and the National Network. First, the proposed federal law would 
have to be considered constitutional, taking into consideration the powers provided to 
the federal government by the U.S. Constitution. Second, the proposed bill for the 
development of a federal law would need a primary sponsor and would likely require 
support from not only the federal government but also the National Network. Based on 
the exploratory interviews, it appears that it would be difficult to gain support from the 
National Network based on the belief that the National Network should remain under 
state and local government control. The majority of interviewees were passionately 
opposed to federal government involvement, and the primary sponsor would likely face 
considerable pushback from the state governments as well as possible constitutional 
challenges to a proposed federal law. 
C. CONGRESSIONALLY APPROVED INTERSTATE COMPACT 
According to Kevin Heron, “An interstate compact is an agreement between two 
or more states established for the purpose of remedying a particular problem of multistate 
concern.”92 States face many issues that do not start and stop at the state border, like 
homeland security–related issues that may benefit from uniform regional and national 
procedures to successfully manage operational and legal concerns. Interstate compacts 
offer a tool to manage multi-state issues since states are able to negotiate and agree on the 
92 Kevin J. Heron, “The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State Action to 
Congressionally Coerced Agreements,” St. John’s Law Review 60, no. 1 (June 2012), 
http://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol60/iss1/1. 
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framework that will be applied to specific multi-state issues and take collective action to 
ensure the most favorable outcome for all the participating states. 
Once an interstate compact is negotiated by the states, it is then signed by the 
respective governors of each participating state. The interstate compact typically becomes 
effective once at least two states codify the compact in state law through the traditional 
legislative process, providing state legislative authority for the terms of the agreement. 
The interstate compact development process provides participating states the authority to 
influence the terms of the compact, which provides control over the content of the 
agreement as well as the terms of the states’ relationships with one another. If the 
interstate compact is determined to need congressional approval, approval by Congress 
provides authority for the interstate compact in federal law. Article 1, section 10, clause 
3, of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Compact Clause, states in part, “No State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State.” Although the language of the clause seems to require that all interstate compacts 
be approved by Congress, the Supreme Court has determined that congressional consent 
is only required when the resulting agreement impacts the balance of power between the 
federal and state governments or when it encroaches on a power granted to Congress.93 
Congressional consent can happen expressly, implicitly, or 
pre-emptively.94 
Explicit approval occurs after the adopted compact is submitted to Congress and 
Congress has consented to the terms.95 Implicit approval relies on actions of state and 
federal governments to presume consent.96 And pre-emptive approval occurs in advance 
of any interstate compact adoption, when the federal government passes legislation 
empowering states to enter an interstate compact for a specific policy issue.97 There is no 
93 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). 
94 “Congressional Consent and the Permission for States to Enter into Interstate Compacts,” Council 
of State Governments, accessed March 26, 2018, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/congressional-
consent-and-permission-states-enter-interstate-compacts. 
95 Council of State Governments. 
96 Council of State Governments. 
97 Council of State Governments. 
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bright line rule provided by the U.S. Constitution, or even the Supreme Court, on how to 
determine when congressional consent is required, aside from the analysis related to 
whether it affects the balance of power between federal and state governments and/or it 
encroaches on power granted to the federal government by Congress.98 Therefore, each 
interstate compact must be individually evaluated to determine what form of consent, if 
any, is appropriate. 
One benefit of utilizing an interstate compact for state-to-state uniformity is that it 
leaves considerable control in the hands of sovereign state governments to collectively 
manage their multistate, regional, and national issues. The article titled “Congressional 
Consent and the Permission for States to Enter into Interstate Compacts” published by the 
National Center for Interstate Compacts, explains that interstate compacts empower the 
state parties to develop and dictate the terms of their relationship with one another, 
without federal interference or control.99 The ability of states to work together to develop 
the most advantageous relationship to handle their interstate issues can result in a 
meaningful and effective agreement since it is reasoned and negotiated by the states that 
are affected by it. Caroline Broun et al. explain, “Compacts enable the states to, in their 
sovereign capacities, act jointly and collectively, generally outside the confines of the 
federal legislative or regulatory process, while concomitantly respecting the view of 
Congress on the appropriateness of joint action.”100 Rather than asserting individual state 
sovereignty, an interstate compact relies on the collective sovereignty of multiple states 
to establish control of state, regional, and national issues related to governance and 
responsibility. Interstate compacts empower the state governments to address their needs 
without the federal government imposing its will. 
There are more than 200 interstate compacts in existence today; 22 of them are 
national compacts, meaning that every state in the nation is a party to the agreement.101 
                                                 
98 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 68–69. 
99 National Center for Interstate Compacts, “Understanding Interstate Compacts.” 
100 Caroline N. Broun et al., The Evolving Use and Changing Role of Interstate Compacts: A 
Practitioner’s Guide, 1st ed. (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2006), 26–27. 
101 “Interstate Compacts Fact Sheet,” National Center for Interstate Compacts, accessed March 26, 
2018, https://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/FactSheet.pdf. 
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Examples of national compacts include the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact, concerning mutual aid during times of emergencies and disasters, and the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, providing a mechanism for detaining incarcerated 
individuals for return to another state for trial.102 Additionally, 30 interstate compacts are 
regional in nature involving eight or more participating states, and numerous interstate 
compacts exist between fewer than eight states.103 Interstate compacts cover a variety of 
interstate issues including border disputes, water allocations, child welfare, and driver’s 
license reciprocity, to name a few. 
1. Application of Interviewee Criteria to a Congressionally Approved 
Interstate Compact 
An interstate compact is not only a formal legal contract with related enforcement 
options; it also shares state legislative adoption authority and enforcement.104 In order for 
a state to join an interstate compact, it must first enact the text of the interstate compact 
into state law. As an example, the text of the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact contains the following language: “This compact shall become effective 
immediately upon its enactment into law by any two states. Thereafter, this compact shall 
become effective as to any other state upon enactment by such state.”105 Therefore, as 
each state legislature adopts the interstate compact within its statutory scheme, the state 
becomes a participant within the compact.106 The result is the enactment of the compact 
language as state statutory authority in each participating state. 
Since the enacted state statutory authority in every state and territory that joins the 
interstate compact is identical or substantially similar, a congressionally approved interstate 
compact has the potential to create national uniformity if all 50 states, the District of 
                                                 
102 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 305, 445. 
103 National Center for Interstate Compacts, “Interstate Compacts Fact Sheet.” 
104 National Center for Interstate Compacts, “Understanding Interstate Compacts.” 
105 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321, 104th Cong., 2d sess. 
(October 19, 1996). 
106 Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 
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Columbia, and U.S. territories are willing to enact the compact.107 In contrast to a model 
law, state legislatures are not able to substantially adjust the text of the interstate compact 
in state law without breaching the contract between parties, ensuring uniformity among 
participants. Since national uniformity through a congressionally approved interstate 
compact has occurred in 22 different interstate compacts, national uniformity is 
possible.108 
Last, congressionally approved interstate compacts are an “expression of state 
sovereignty” vis-à-vis the federal government.109 The only caveat is that interstate 
compacts are accomplished through the application of shared or collective sovereignty with 
other participating states rather than individual state sovereignty. Interstate compacts 
provide a sovereign state or territory the opportunity to participate in the negotiation of the 
compact and then the choice to enact the compact in its jurisdiction. Due to the contractual 
nature of an interstate compact, once it is enacted, changes to the law cannot occur absent 
consent of the participating states, ensuring consistency of law across state lines.110 A 
summary of interviewee criteria applied to an interstate compact is outlined in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of Interviewee Criteria Applied to an Interstate Compact111 








Yes Possible Yes, collective 
 
                                                 
107 Non-material changes to compact language do not invalidate an interstate compact. As an example 
of how EMAC handled this issue, § 4 of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact states, “The 
validity of this compact shall not be affected by any insubstantial difference in its form or language as 
adopted by the States.” Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Public Law 104-321. 
108 National Center for Interstate Compacts, “Interstate Compacts Fact Sheet.” 
109 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 50–52. 
110 Buenger et al., 43. 
111 Adapted from responses from Interviewees #1–11. 
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2. Application of a Congressionally Approved Interstate Compact to the 
National Network 
The application of the interviewees’ criteria reveals that a congressionally 
approved interstate compact has the potential to satisfy all three priorities of the 
interviewees. First, the enactment of an interstate compact would create statutory 
authority for fusion centers—and their relationship with one another—in every 
participating state. The resulting state law could provide the operational guidance as well 
as a path to state funding that the interviewees requested. Second, due to the contractual 
nature of interstate compacts, every state that enacts the interstate compact will have 
identical, or substantially similar, laws, alleviating the stress and chaos of non-uniformity 
among fusion centers in an information-sharing environment. It is noteworthy that 
national uniformity is not guaranteed, as each state has the power of choice to join and 
enact an interstate compact―although national uniformity has been achieved in 22 other 
situations―distinguishing an interstate compact from model laws. Since interstate 
compact law, which is written by participating states, has standing as federal law upon 
congressional approval, any conflicting state statutes from participating states are 
trumped by the interstate compact law. This feature would eliminate the inconsistencies 
of existing state laws across the National Network by allowing record management laws 
to be developed without having to amend existing state laws. 
Last, the fusion center leadership will be able to remain in control of the National 
Network, which was identified as a top priority to the interviewees. The ability for fusion 
center leaders to participate in the development of the legal and operational framework 
for the National Network should satisfy the concerns of the interviewees who believe the 
network should remain in the hands of state and local governments. 
The complexity of developing an interstate compact is worth mentioning. Since 
the intent of an interstate compact is to create regional or national uniformity, regional or 
national buy-in is critical to the success of the interstate compact. In the case of the 
National Network, national uniformity would likely be the end goal; therefore, the 
negotiations between the interested parties in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
the participating U.S. territories would be complex to say the least. The exploratory 
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interviews reflect a belief that some of the terms of the compact would be easier to 
negotiate than others, with the majority of interviewees believing that consensus on terms 
of the interstate compact is possible. The interview responses also reflect a 
misunderstanding by many of the interviewees about how interstate compacts work and 
their standing when in conflict with existing state laws. Many interviewees felt that 
existing state laws would prevent agreement on the negotiated terms of an interstate 
compact because amending state law is too political and time consuming. However, since 
a congressionally approved interstate compact―as federal law―would trump existing 
state law in the area of fusion center operation, confidence in the use of an interstate 
compact should grow with a better understanding of the legal mechanism. Interviewee 
#11 offered an interesting perspective when he stated that an interstate compact would 
probably interest 75 percent of the states, with a willingness to participate and agree to 
compact language, putting the National Network in a better position than it is now with 
no consistency across state lines.112 
D. CONCLUSION 
The comparison of three legal mechanisms with the potential to create legal 
uniformity leads to the conclusion that an interstate compact is the most beneficial 
approach to satisfy the reported desires of the policymakers within the National Network. 
In addition to creating statutory authority within each participating state and territory, 
interstate compacts have the potential to create national uniformity for fusion center 
operations. As reported, the interviews reflect a very low tolerance for federal 
involvement in the development of the legal and operational framework for state and 
local agencies that comprise the National Network. But since interstate compacts honor 
the principles of state sovereignty vis-à-vis the federal government, the interstate compact 
development process allows policymakers within the network to determine the most 
appropriate legal and operational framework to maximize the capabilities of the National 
Network. 
                                                 
112 Interviewee #11 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
 48 
Furthermore, the contractual nature of interstate compacts distinguishes the legal 
mechanism from model laws in a significant and meaningful way. The binding 
contractual relationship developed through the negotiation, acceptance, and codification 
of an interstate compact prevents substantive alteration by a state legislature once signed 
by the governor, without breaching the agreement between the participating states. This 
contractual relationship ensures that an interstate compact, and state and federal law 
created by it, will not be unilaterally changed in the future. Rather, the participating states 
are required to make the collective decision to alter the existing agreement if change to 
the legal and operational framework is desired. The predictability and longevity of the 
legal relationship between states as a result of an interstate compact provide assurances 
that are critical to handling complicated and/or sensitive interstate legal issues.113 A 
summary of interviewee criteria applied to model laws, federal laws, and an interstate 
compact appears in Table 5. 
Table 5. Summary of Interviewee Criteria Applied to Model Laws, Federal Laws, 
and an Interstate Compact114 
 State Statutory Authority 
National 
Uniformity State Sovereignty 
Model Laws  Yes Unlikely Yes 
Federal Laws No Yes No 
Interstate Compact  Yes Possible Yes, collective 
 
  
                                                 
113 Interviewee #11 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
114 Adapted from responses from Interviewees #1–11. 
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IV. ASSERTING COLLECTIVE STATE SOVEREIGNTY TO 
STRENGTHEN THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF FUSION 
CENTERS 
The exploratory interviews revealed that nearly all of the interviewees were 
concerned about their fusion centers’ operational and legal compliance but felt there was 
no reasonable solution to create legal uniformity since the National Network consists of 
79 fusion centers from 50 sovereign states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. 
territories. The Fusion Center Guidelines, which were developed to serve as foundational 
guidance for fusion center operation, addressed the need for uniformity in the National 
Network as early as 2006, yet 12 years later, no legal framework has been formed to 
address the operational inconsistencies within the network. 
Although each fusion center will have its unique characteristics, it is 
important for centers to operate under a consistent framework—similar to 
the construction of a group of buildings where each structure is unique, yet 
a consistent set of building codes and regulation are adhered to regardless 
of the size and shape of the building.115 
This research leads to the conclusion that the majority of fusion center leaders 
interviewed want uniformity within the National Network as many feel uncertain and 
insecure about the legality of their operations. As Interviewee #1 explained, “I feel like 
there are a lot of states that are in the same boat as I am where they’re just winging it.”116 
Fusion centers should not be expected to “wing it”; fusion centers deserve to have 
confidence in the legality and appropriateness of their operations given the important role 
they play in the homeland security enterprise. And due to the multi-jurisdictional nature 
of the National Network, legal uniformity is critical to providing a working environment 
that cultivates predictability and trust among all members of the network. 
                                                 
115 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: 
Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Justice, August 2006), 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf. 
116 Interviewee #1 (state director), confidential interview. 
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In order to fully evaluate interstate compacts for use by the National Network, 
there are numerous advantages—as well as a few disadvantages—to consider when 
contemplating the legal relationship. The following sections in this chapter address the 
advantages and disadvantages of utilizing an interstate compact. 
A. ADVANTAGES OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
There are five specific benefits to the utilization of an interstate compact: 1) the 
fortification of state sovereignty, 2) the establishment of an enforceable legal agreement, 
3) state and federal legislative authority, 4) uniform judicial interpretation, and 5) the 
preemption of federal interference. 
1. Fortification of State Sovereignty 
Since every state and territory has the ability to create its own laws, an issue that 
crosses state lines and imputes laws of other states, proves to be a great challenge because 
it involves the laws and policies of more than one sovereign government. However, 
interstate compacts allow states to come together to address the inconsistencies in law 
that impact their multistate operations. The article titled “Understanding Interstate 
Compacts” published by the National Center for Interstate Compacts, explains that 
interstate compacts empower the state parties to develop and dictate the terms of their 
relationships with one another, without federal interference or control.117 The ability of 
states to work together to develop the most advantageous relationship to handle their 
interstate issues can result in a meaningful and effective agreement since it is reasoned 
and negotiated by the states that it impacts, allowing the states to ensure they are able to 
effectively operate under the terms of the agreement. As explained in The Evolving Use 
and the Changing Role of Interstate Compacts, “Compacts enable the states to, in their 
sovereign capacities, act jointly and collectively, generally outside the confines of the 
federal legislative or regulatory process, while concomitantly respecting the view of 
Congress on the appropriateness of joint action.”118 
                                                 
117 National Center for Interstate Compacts, “Understanding Interstate Compacts.” 
118 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 26–27. 
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Rather than asserting their individual state sovereignty, an interstate compact 
relies on the collective or shared sovereignty of multiple states to establish control of 
state, regional, and national issues related to governance and responsibility. Interstate 
compacts empower the state governments to come together to address their needs without 
the federal government imposing its will on the states. Of course, article 1, section 10, 
clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution demands the consent of Congress to formalize its 
interstate relationship but falls short of allowing the federal government to dictate the 
terms thereof. In a scenario in which national uniformity is desired but federal 
government control is disfavored, interstate compacts present a legal mechanism that 
honors state sovereignty by empowering the states to determine the most effective legal 
and operational framework. 
2. Enforceable Legal Contract 
An interstate compact is a valid contract and must be interpreted consistently with 
the tenets of contract law, which includes an offer, acceptance, mutual consent of the 
parties, and consideration.119 Courts have routinely found interstate compacts to be valid 
contracts.120 The offer is extended once the first participating state enacts an interstate 
compact into state law through the legislative process, and a contract is accepted once 
any other state enacts the same, or substantially similar, interstate compact into state law 
through its legislative process.121 As noted, no material changes to an interstate compact 
are permitted through the legislative process without calling into question the validity of 
the interstate compact.122 And absent uniformity in state law, there will remain a 
question as to whether there has been a meeting of the minds for the purpose of contract 
validity.123 In general contract terms, consideration is often understood to include an 
exchange of money, but it may also include mutual promises made between the 
                                                 
119 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 18 (2018); and Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001). 
120 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 33–36; and Kansas v. 
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001). 
121 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 44. 
122 Buenger et al., 44–47. 
123 Buenger et al., 44–47. 
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parties.124 In the case of an interstate compact, mutual promises are made between the 
participating states to perform obligations under the terms of the compact. Since an 
interstate compact is an approach to solving an existing multistate issue, consideration 
includes the agreement to abide by the operational and/or legal frameworks established 
by the compact. Additionally, in order to enact an interstate compact, each party state 
exchanges its individual state sovereignty in the area(s) dictated by the interstate compact 
to solve a joint issue through the use of collective state sovereignty.125 The exchange of 
individual state sovereignty for the greater good of the participating states is also a form 
of consideration, as each party must decide to surrender individual state sovereignty in an 
area of governance to participate in the compact.126 
The contractual nature of an interstate compact is significant in the analysis of 
interstate compact benefits. Since interstate compacts are contracts, they are binding legal 
agreements on each party state, their courts, and even their political subdivisions.127 As a 
result, an interstate compact may not be changed or altered without collective approval of 
all party states, ensuring the longevity of the established relationships. Therefore, the 
contractual nature of an interstate contract provides all participating states “a predictable, 
stable, and enforceable mechanism for policy control and implementation.”128 
3. State and Federal Legislative Authority 
In addition to serving as a valid and enforceable legal agreement, interstate 
compacts also create state law as well as federal law, if congressionally approved.129 
When an interstate compact has standing as federal law, it provides additional benefits to 
the participating states. 
                                                 
124 Storm v. United States, 94 U.S. 76, 83 (1876). 
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128 Buenger et al., 26. 
129 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 434 (1981). 
 53 
a. Interstate Compact Law Trumps Existing State Law 
When an interstate compact receives congressional approval, it has no impact on 
the legal nature of contractual relationship between states; it does, however, transform the 
interstate agreement into federal law.130 In Cuyler v. Adams, the court stated, 
Where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative 
agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an 
appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress 
transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact 
Clause.131 
One implication of the transformation of an agreement into federal law is that federal law 
can trump existing state law where there is a conflict, absent the reservation of power 
within the interstate compact. Only a few interstate compacts have specifically stated that 
the federal law developed by a congressionally approved interstate compact does not 
supersede existing state law or preserves only specific state laws; however, when an 
interstate compact lacks a specific reservation of state authority, the courts have found 
that the federal interstate compact law supersedes conflicting state law.132 
While a majority of the interviewees had limited knowledge concerning the legal 
implications of a congressionally approved interstate compact, Interviewee #11 had 
considerable experience with another interstate compact that garnered national 
participation. When asked about the impact of the federal standing of an interstate 
compact for the National Network and the ability for the compact to trump conflicting 
state law, Interviewee #11 described it as “a game changer,” explaining that reaching a 
consensus for state public records laws would be nearly impossible given the existing and 
varied public records laws across the United States.133 The fact that existing state laws do 
not need to be changed to enact an interstate compact is a significant benefit for state 
participants. 
                                                 
130 Buenger et al., The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, 94. 
131 Buenger et al., 95. 
132 Buenger et al., 54–56. 
133 Interviewee #11 (major urban-area director), confidential interview. 
 54 
b. Uniform Judicial Interpretation 
The ultimate interpretation of any dispute resulting from the terms of an interstate 
compact would be through the federal judiciary and the U.S. Supreme Court, based on 
the original jurisdiction and/or the existence of a federal question.134 Original jurisdiction 
occurs in a lawsuit whereby a state is a party and a federal question exists in a dispute 
concerning federal law.135 Since interstate compacts not only exist between states but are 
also subject to federal law due to congressional consent, jurisdiction generally exists with 
the federal judiciary rather than state courts, resulting in a more consistent legal 
interpretation across participating states. The federal judiciary jurisdiction results in 
predictability and stability in the law, related policy, and the resulting enforcement of the 
terms of the interstate compact. 
However, it is important to note that the nature of an interstate compact as federal 
law does not preclude the involvement of state courts.136 An interstate compact could 
conceivably dictate state court jurisdiction in its text, or a case may involve a particular 
state law that results in a state court review of the interstate compact.137 Even if a state 
court is ultimately determined to have jurisdiction over a matter related to an interstate 
compact, the state court is required to interpret the interstate compact as federal law.138 
Absent an explicit designation of state court jurisdiction, parties to an interstate compact 
may disagree on which state laws apply to the dispute, creating a complicated problem. 
For the purposes of consistency and predictability, federal court interpretation has 
significant advantages because it prevents conflicting judicial interpretations across state 
lines. 
                                                 
134 Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1051–52 (2015). 
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c. Preventing Federal Interference 
Another benefit of the interstate compact is the prevention of federal interference 
on state-related issues that may have regional or national significance.139 Unregulated or 
poorly regulated areas that have national significance can be at risk for federal oversight 
or interference; however, if the states collaboratively and effectively manage the state-to-
state issues and the related national issues, it may deter the federal government from 
possible overreach.140 The literature suggests that interstate compacts provide flexibility 
in regulation, as compared to a national-level policy that dictates the requirements for 
every state.141 Most significantly, the development of an interstate compact stays in the 
hands of the states, allowing states to collaboratively develop a law and the resulting 
policy, which is in the best interest of affected states. Despite the states’ control of the 
compact relationship, the requirement of congressional consent demands federal 
consideration and buy-in as well as the determination by Congress that the mission of the 
interstate compact is consistent with congressional power in that area.142 This process 
ultimately provides for the appropriate balance of power designed by the U.S. 
Constitution through the Compact Clause. 
Nearly every interviewee was adamant that the control of the National Network 
should stay with the state and local governments rather than be ceded to the federal 
government. Although some interviewees admitted that allowing the federal government 
to control the National Network may be easier, none were convinced that it was the right 
thing to do. When Interviewee # 3 was asked about the federalization of the National 
Network, he preferred the “multistate collective . . . over federalization,” explaining that 
when the federal government takes control, the needs of the states no longer apply.143 
Admittedly, the makeup of the National Network is a complicated problem considering 
                                                 
139 Buenger et al., 24–25. 
140 “Interstate Compacts vs. Uniform Laws,” National Center for Interstate Compacts, accessed 
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the desire for legal and operational uniformity, but one way to ensure that control stays in 
the hands of state and local governments is for them to take the responsibility of creating 
an operational and legal framework necessary to make the network successful. 
B. DISADVANTAGES OF AN INTERSTATE COMPACT 
Interstate compacts are very powerful tools available to state governments seeking 
to manage multistate issues for the collective good of multiple states; however, interstate 
compacts have some disadvantages, too, which should be addressed prior to determining 
the value of the legal mechanism to the National Network. The reported disadvantages 
include the time-consuming and challenging process of developing and negotiating an 
interstate compact, the perceived loss of individual state sovereignty, and the cost and 
complexity of judicial enforcement. 
1. Complexity of Negotiations 
An agreement on the terms of an interstate compact from all 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, and U.S. territories would be a time-consuming and challenging project. 
Political interests of each potential participating state may have a negative impact on the 
negotiation of the interstate compact; those political interests may also prevent the 
ultimate adoption of an interstate compact, which would have regional or national 
benefits.144 It took nearly 10 years before all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and all 
U.S. territories had adopted the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
(EMAC).145 Additionally, the national adoption of the EMAC was believed to have been 
impacted by the tragedy on 9/11, motivating at least New York, a holdout state, to join 
the interstate compact.146 Due to its time commitment and complexity, developing an 
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interstate compact does not present an immediate solution to the problem as it requires 
extensive negotiation, state legislative adoption, and congressional approval. 
When discussing the use of an interstate compact to help create legal and 
operational uniformity in the National Network, Interviewee #4 expressed concerns about 
the legal mechanism due to the complexity of negotiations. Interviewee #4 explained that 
getting 50 governors engaged in the negotiation would involve too many different 
opinions: “I don’t see the need for it. In fact, I think that it would cause more problems 
than it’s worth.”147 In contrast, a number of interviewees felt that a basic structure for a 
compact would be a reasonable goal, asserting that the majority of states could agree on a 
broad mission, sensitive document classifications, and public records exceptions.148 
Interviewee #2 stated, “It’s been done for other things, why can’t it be done for 
something similar in fusion centers? I mean, we’re not building a rocket ship here; we’re 
just trying to share information and keep everybody safe.”149 
2. Perceived Loss of Individual State Sovereignty 
Another reported disadvantage of an interstate compact is the perception by states 
that they are surrendering their individual state sovereignty.150 The literature suggests 
that many state legislatures are reluctant to cede state sovereignty, especially where the 
interstate compact creates administrative bodies that assume governing power and control 
over the party states.151 According to Buenger et al., “This sharing of traditional state 
sovereignty to supra-state administrative bodies effectively means that individual states 
lose direct policy control over the issue that sparked interest in the compact.”152 Losing 
individual state sovereignty, or the perception of it, may discourage participation of states 
                                                 
147 Interviewee #4 (major urban-area director), confidential interview with author, September 22, 
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in the negotiation of an interstate compact, fearing the loss of individual control of their 
states’ needs. Furthermore, once a state joins an interstate compact, it is unable to 
unilaterally revoke or amend the compact due to the contractual nature of the interstate 
compact, preventing any quick or unilateral changes to the relationship.153 Rather, any 
changes to an interstate compact would require agreement by all party states, as well as 
Congress, unless the interstate compact explicitly allows for unilateral termination by a 
party state.154 
The permanence of the interstate compact relationship can be a deterrent to a 
state’s willingness to become a party to the agreement, although the permanence is also 
seen as one of the benefits due to the predictable operational and legal framework it 
creates in state and federal laws. Alternatively, in The Evolving Law and Use of Interstate 
Compacts, Buenger et al. explains the decision to enter an interstate compact is actually 
an “expression of state sovereignty” since each state independently chooses to join and 
enact the terms of a compact.155 Due to the varied perspectives related to the impact of 
individual versus collective state sovereignty, a state’s willingness to enact an interstate 
compact may be swayed by the desire to maintain individual and unencumbered control 
over state law and policy in the area of fusion centers. 
3. Enforcement and Its Costs 
Interstate compacts rely on the willingness of participants to comply with the 
agreement negotiated by the states, and any failure of a participant to comply with the 
interstate compact leaves the remaining states to encourage participation or take the case 
to the federal judiciary to enforce the terms of the compact.156 The process of litigating 
an issue related to a congressionally approved interstate compact would be time 
consuming and expensive, in comparison to a dispute that could be litigated in state court. 
As a result, the “effectiveness of a compact continues to rest upon the willingness of the 
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member states to actually abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement 
notwithstanding its contractual nature.”157 Absent willing compliance by the party states, 
the benefits of the interstate compact may be jeopardized by the time and cost to enforce 
the agreement. 
C. A SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL INTERSTATE COMPACT: 
THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT 
EMAC is an example of a congressionally approved interstate compact that has 
garnered participation from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.158 The purpose of EMAC is to establish an operational and 
legal framework to enable the sharing of resources during a governor-declared 
emergency or disaster to enhance public safety.159 “EMAC acts as a complement to the 
federal disaster response system, providing timely and cost-effective relief to states 
requesting assistance from assisting member states who understand the needs of 
jurisdictions that are struggling to provide life, the economy, and the environment.”160 It 
also provides a legal foundation and mechanism for states wishing to help other states in 
need through a legally binding agreement that provides, in part, for reimbursement 
responsibility, liability provisions, and cross-border licensing terms.161 
The legal protections contained in EMAC are a large part of what make the 
compact so critical to emergency management response and recovery. The benefits of 
EMAC include the creation of predictability and uniformity among member states when 
determining how costs are allocated, how disputes are resolved, who covers insurance for 
personnel crossing state borders, and which parties are responsible for liability based on 
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the performance of out-of-state resources and personnel.162 EMAC allows states, in times 
of extreme need and when time is of the essence, to get the help they need to protect their 
citizens without wasting time and energy worrying about legal agreements and details. 
EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association 
(NEMA), a “nonpartisan, nonprofit 501(c)(3) association dedicated to enhancing public 
safety by improving the nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all 
emergencies, disasters, and threats to our nation’s security.”163 NEMA is an affiliate of 
the Council of State Governments, and its board of directors is comprised of the state 
emergency management directors from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and eight 
U.S. territories.164 Its staff provides support for the EMAC mission on behalf of the 
states and facilitates the sharing of resources when the need arises.165 EMAC has been 
utilized to assist states in their response to, and recovery from, numerous emergencies 
and disasters, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, 
and many more.166 EMAC serves as an example of a public safety–driven interstate 
compact that has garnered national participation and the consent of Congress. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This research evaluated whether the lack of legal uniformity within the National 
Network creates operational challenges for fusion centers. The interview results from 11 
fusion center directors, deputy directors, and senior leaders demonstrated that the existing 
multi-jurisdictional legal framework adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of 
information sharing. Based on the criteria set by the interviewees, three legal mechanisms 
with the potential to create legal uniformity were evaluated to determine which, if any, 
would be appropriate to address the lack of legal uniformity within the National Network. 
The results of this research conclude that the implementation of an interstate compact is the 
optimal legal mechanism to create legal uniformity.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section presents three recommendations based on review of relevant literature, 
legal doctrine, and interview results. 
1. The National Network of Fusion Centers Should Attempt to Negotiate 
an Interstate Compact and Seek Congressional Approval 
A congressionally approved interstate compact provides a very powerful and 
unique legal mechanism for sovereign states to collectively conceive of, negotiate as a 
group of interested parties, and enact law as a unified network of fusion centers. The power 
of this legal mechanism is twofold. First, it institutes identical or substantially similar state 
law in every participating jurisdiction leading to fusion center establishment and 
operational guidance in each state’s statutory scheme, as well as predictability as to how 
each fusion center will operate regardless of its jurisdictional location. Second, if 
congressionally approved, the state law will also have standing as federal law, which 
ensures that the law created by the interstate compact trumps any conflicting law in each 
participating state. The federal law status is exceptionally important in the fusion center 
environment where states may already have robust public records laws, open meeting laws, 
or investigation-related statutes that currently apply to fusion centers but conflict with the 
terms of the proposed interstate compact. Practically speaking, fusion centers can negotiate 
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laws in an interstate compact that conflict with their state’s existing laws, without having to 
go through the legislative process of amending them, which is arduous and time 
consuming. An interstate compact provides the best of both worlds. If states want to create 
uniformity within the National Network while maintaining the independence and 
sovereignty afforded them by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, an interstate compact is 
the ideal legal mechanism to affect that change. 
2. The Interstate Compact Should Include Laws Related to Information 
Sharing (Public Records, Open Meeting Laws, Sensitive Document 
Designations, and 28 CFR Part 23) 
Effective information sharing is critical to the mission of every fusion center within 
the National Network. Currently, fusion centers do not have assurances related to the 
treatment of their information and intelligence when it is shared outside their fusion center. 
Any hesitation to share information across state lines due to uncertainty or legal liability 
only undermines the effectiveness of the National Network’s ability to conduct its principle 
mission to “detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist related 
activity.”167 The exploratory interviews revealed that if an interstate compact were 
negotiated by the National Network, nearly every interviewee would want the interstate 
compact to focus on the development of information-sharing laws. The interviewees 
expressed that standardization of information-sharing concerns, such as definitions, public 
records exceptions, and document designations, would resolve a number of issues that 
currently exist within the National Network, including the lack of predictability and trust 
among fusion centers. 
A number of interviewees believe that a consensus―although an admittedly 
complicated task―for the interstate compact could be reached to address many of the basic 
information-sharing concerns, especially regarding document designations. In addition to 
the development of uniform document designations, the inclusion of 28 C.F.R. Part 23 in 
the proposed interstate compact is a relatively simple addition since all fusion centers 
receiving homeland security grant funding are currently required to comply with this 
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federal regulation in the operation of multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems.168 
The federal regulation provides guidance on how to operate criminal intelligence systems 
within a legal framework and is designed to ensure protection of privacy and the other 
constitutional rights of individuals through operating principles that require a reasonable 
suspicion standard for data collection and retention.169 The focus on citizens’ constitutional 
and privacy rights within the interstate compact will likely contribute to the willingness of 
Congress to approve the compact and provide U.S. citizens with the assurances, and clarity 
in state law, needed to feel comfortable with fusion center operations. 
The interview results reflect a consistent negativity toward the possibility of 
creating public record exceptions for fusion center–related documents through a 
congressionally approved interstate compact. It seems, however, that the negativity of the 
proposal stems from a misunderstanding of how a congressionally approved interstate 
compact would interact with existing laws in each state. It appears there is a belief that 
existing state laws would have to be changed for the National Network to create a public 
records exception for certain fusion center records through the use of an interstate compact, 
which would likely be an arduous and unsuccessful mission. However, interstate compacts 
do not require state legislative changes to existing laws. Rather, the law created by a 
congressionally approved interstate compact would become a supplemental piece of state 
legislation that only applies to the subject matter of the compact, which in this case would 
be the operation of fusion centers. Therefore, any existing state public records laws would 
not have to change to enact an interstate compact. 
3. The National Fusion Center Association Is Perfectly Positioned to Lead 
the Negotiation of an Interstate Compact for the National Network 
The National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) is responsible for representing the 
interests of state and major urban-area fusion centers within the National Network. Since 
each member of the National Network belongs to the NFCA, the NFCA provides an 
opportunity for a consolidated voice from the membership as well as access to the fusion 
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center leaders in each state. According to the interviewees, the NFCA has already put an 
emphasis on uniformity through the creation of a three-year strategy for the National 
Network, which presented “a vision, a mission, goals, objectives, and initiatives that are 
needed for the National Network of Fusion Centers to systematically improve intelligence 
information sharing.”170 The NFCA has also participated in the development of every 
annex of the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which 
sets forth operational standards for fusion centers.171 Since the NFCA has taken the 
initiative to recommend and work toward uniformity within the National Network, and has 
working relationships with every fusion center in the National Network, the NFCA has 
conducted much of the operational research necessary to lead in the negotiation of an 
interstate compact. As Interviewee #7 explained, the NFCA’s job is to “lobby for the fusion 
centers in terms of legislation,” describing the association as the logical entity to pursue the 
negotiation of the interstate compact.172 
B. CONCLUSION 
The lack of legal uniformity in the National Network is not a simple problem, and 
there is no simple solution. But operating in a “network” with 79 fusion centers and 54 
different legal frameworks while trying to detect and prevent criminal- and terrorism-
related activity is not a simple task either. And the lack of legal challenges related to fusion 
center operations, as well as the lack of published court opinions, may be giving the 
members of the National Network a false sense of security in their daily fusion center 
operations. There is considerable ambiguity in the law related to fusion centers, so―in 
order for this important aspect of the public safety community to be capable of operating at 
its fullest potential―they need guidance and authority to carry out their mission. State 
governments, with the input of local governments, should take the lead role in determining 
the National Network’s ideal operational and legal framework. 
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While it may be easier on the National Network if it were to cede its control to the 
federal government to take advantage of existing federal laws, in doing so, the National 
Network would be surrendering the authority that the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
afforded state governments to manage the affairs of their states. The desire for a simple 
solution to uniformity in the National Network is not worth sacrificing the sovereignty of 
state governments. Instead, the National Network should come together to work toward the 
optimal solution for the network, one that provides state and local governments the control 
and authority needed to dictate the breadth of their operational capabilities, as well as to set 
achievable expectations that federal government and the U.S. Intelligence Community can 
count on from the network. A congressionally approved interstate compact places the 
future of the National Network in the hands of state and local governments―where it 
belongs. 
This position in not intended to be viewed as anti-federal; rather, it is pro-state 
sovereignty. The federal government plays an absolutely critical role in the productivity of 
the National Network, as a contributor of substantial funding as well as an essential partner 
in the mission of public safety. However, segments of the federal government have been 
highly critical of the National Network over the years, often suggesting that the network 
fails to make an adequate contribution to the homeland security enterprise. However, given 
the inadequacies of the existing legal and operational framework within the National 
Network, it actually highlights how successful fusion centers have been in an uncertain 
environment. Furthermore, the federal government, as a contributor of funding and a 
recipient of critical fusion center intelligence, would also be a beneficiary of uniformity 
within the National Network. 
A 2017 report by the House Homeland Security Committee titled Advancing the 
Homeland Security Information Sharing Environment: A Review of the National Network 
of Fusion Centers describes the negative impact of state legislation on fusion centers’ 
ability to share information and coordinate with the federal government: “The Committee 
is concerned these changes could undermine the significant progress made since the 
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September 11, 2001, terror attack.”173 An interstate compact that eliminates variation in 
state law related to information sharing while ensuring legal coordination with the federal 
government would not only eliminate this concern for the federal government in the future 
but also enhance information-sharing capabilities across all levels of government. The 
result could be a clear mission, delineated responsibilities, and consistent contributions 
from fusion centers across the network. And, by creating consistency in state legislation, it 
will increase the flow of information between participating states and the federal 
government. The ability to provide the federal government predictability and clear 
expectations from the National Network will improve satisfaction and encourage the 
longevity of the critical relationship between the federal and state governments. Therefore, 
the creation of legal uniformity is not just a benefit for the states; it has the potential to 
benefit federal government partners as well. 
A tremendous amount of federal, state, and local funding has been expended to 
establish a capable and robust network of fusion centers; however, despite the financial 
investment, insufficient time and energy has been dedicated to the creation of an effective 
legal and operational framework for the existence of the National Network. Absent an 
effective framework, the National Network will remain unable to reach its maximum 
operational capability due to legal uncertainty among fusion centers and the resulting lack 
of trust within the network. A congressionally approved interstate compact can fulfill the 
desires of the National Network’s leadership by developing state statutory authority for 
fusion centers, creating national uniformity of fusion center related laws, and allowing the 
state and local governments to determine the framework that will position the National 
Network for success. 
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